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Extinguishing Security Interests:
Secured Claims in Japanese Reorganization Law and 
Some Policy Implications to the U.S. Law
Abstract
This Article examines how secured claims are treated in Japanese business reorganization 
law, especially in the Civil Rehabilitation Act (Minji saisei ho), which was enacted in 1999 as 
the new general reorganization regime in Japan. Unlike the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act does not have automatic stay on secured claims, nor does it allow any 
modification of secured claims by the rehabilitation plans. However, the Civil Rehabilitation 
Act has a unique procedure to restrict the rights of secured creditors, which is called “the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests (tanpo-ken shometsu seikyu tetsuzuki).” This 
procedure permits a debtor to cancel security interests in any property she owns that is 
necessary for continuation of her business, just by paying the secured creditors the liquidation 
value of such property. I analyze how this procedure can reduce the transaction costs which 
would arise if the debtor had to bargain with the secured creditors in order to avoid foreclosure
sales. I also compare this procedure with the way how secured creditors are treated in Chapter 
11of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, and discuss some policy implications to the U.S. law. 
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Extinguishing Security Interests:
Secured Claims in Japanese Business Reorganization Law and 
Some Policy Implications to the U.S. Law*
I. Introduction
Business reorganization law in the United States imposes substantial restrictions on the 
rights of secured creditors.1 First of all, secured creditors are prohibited from enforcing their 
rights at the time when a debtor files for bankruptcy (“automatic stay”).2 Second, each secured 
creditor’s claim is bifurcated into two parts: the part covered by the value of collateral and th e 
part not covered by it. In principle, only the first part is treated as a secured claim in the 
bankruptcy proceeding (“bifurcation”).3 Third, terms of each secured claim can be modified 
notwithstanding the objection of its claimholder. In particular, if the debtor promises to make 
deferred payments, whose present value is at least equal to the value of the collateral, to each 
objecting secured creditor in a reorganization plan, and the plan satisfies other requirements of 
the statute, then the plan will be confirmed by the court and each claim will be modified 
accordingly (“cramdown”).4
 We can hardly say, however, that those restrictions on secured claims are indispensable 
features of any business reorganization law. From a historical perspective, the Bankruptcy Act 
before the 1978 reform – the Chandler Act5 – had a procedure, namely Chapter XI,6 which did 
* For simplicity, any US dollar to Japanese yen (¥) conversion is at the rate of US$1/¥100. 
1
 As for the business reorganization law in the United States, I focus on Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Act. See 11 U.S.C. §§1101- 1174 (2005).
2 See 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(4).
3 See 11 U.S.C. §506(a).
4 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1)&(2)(A).
5 See Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). For an introduction to Chandler Act, see David A. Skeel, 
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not permit secured claims to be modified. Many firms, including publicly held corporations,
were reorganized under Chapter XI, rather than under Chapter X7 which allowed modification 
of secured claims.8 Furthermore, from a perspective of comparative laws, some countries have 
bankruptcy laws that generally do not alter secured claims,9 and others have adopted legal 
restrictions on secured claims only recently.10 Also, even in countries where there exist some 
restrictions on secured claims in bankruptcy – such as Japan –, the ways of restriction may be 
different from those in the United States.
This Article examines how secured creditors are treated in Japanese business 
reorganization law, especially in the Civil Rehabilitation Act (Minji saisei ho),11 which was 
enacted in 1999 as the new general reorganization regime in Japan. In contrast to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Act, the Civil Rehabilitation Act does not have automatic stay on secured claims. In 
principle, secured creditors can freely enforce their rights even after commencement of the 
proceeding.12 Also, while unsecured claims can be modified by a rehabilitation plan that is 
accepted by the majority of unsecured creditors and confirmed by the court, secured claims 
cannot be modified by the plan. However, the Civil Rehabilitation Act has a unique procedure to 
restrict the rights of secured creditors, which is called “the procedure of extinguishing security 
Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 
1368–76 (1998). 
6 See Chandler Act ch.11, 52 Stat. 840, 905-16 (1938) (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. §§ 
701-799 (1938)). 
7 See Chandler Act ch.10, 52 Stat.840, 883-905 (1938) (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C.
§§501-676 (1938)). 
8 See Skeel, supra note 5, at 1375.
9
 One example is German law. See Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act: 
Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 417, 428-29 (1996).
10
 For example, Canadian bankruptcy law did not restrict secured claims before 1985. See F. H. 
Buckly, The American Stay, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 733 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki & George 
Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially 
Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267, 277 (1994).
11
 Law No.225, Dec.22, 1999, last amended by Law No.87, July 26, 2005.
12
 In fact, the Civil Rehabilitation Act has a procedure to allow the court to order stay on 
enforcement of specific security interests in a specified time period (“temporary stay”). Nevertheless, 
requirements for the stay order are rigid and the stay period is usually short. I will explain temporary 
stay later in this Article. See section II.C.1, infra.
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interests (tanpo-ken shometsu seikyu tetsuzuki).”
In essence, this procedure permits a debtor in the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding to cancel
security interests in any property owned by the debtor which is necessary for continuation of 
her13 business, just by paying the creditors who have security interests in it the amount of cash 
equal to the liquidation value of such property. The debtor cannot pay this value by installments
or securities. Only one time payment in cash is acceptable. When parties do not agree on the 
liquidation value of the property, it will be assessed by the court in the appraisal proceeding. For 
example, suppose a debtor owes a creditor $150 and has pledged a property whose liquidation 
value is $120 as collateral. In the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding, the debtor can apply to the 
court for permission of canceling the creditor’s security interest just by paying $120, not $150. 
The difference between the face amount of value of the secured claim and the value of the 
collateral, $30, becomes an unsecured claim, and the creditor can participate in the Civil 
Rehabilitation proceeding with this claim. 
This Article examines what kinds of social benefits and costs the procedure of 
extinguishing security interests might have. I also compare this procedure with the way how 
secured creditors are treated in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy At, and discuss some policy 
implications to the U.S. law. Here is the outline of the argument which will be developed in this 
Article. 
Generally speaking, we need not impose any restrictions on secured claims for successful 
reorganization if there are no obstacles (asymmetric information and/or transaction costs) for a 
debtor and secured creditors to bargain with one another. This is because, in such an ideal world, 
they agree to avoid foreclosure sales when and only when such sales would be inefficient. For 
example, suppose a debtor owes a creditor $150 and has collateralized some real property
13
 Throughout this Article, I use “she” to refer to a debtor and “he” to refer to a (secured or 
unsecured) creditor. 
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whose liquidation value is $120. If the going concern value of the property is, say, $130, then it
is better to use the property for the debtor’s business than to sell it by foreclosure. In this case,
the debtor will promise the secured creditor to pay some price, $p, which is between $120 and 
$130, and ask him not to foreclose on the collateral. Such a bargain will make both parties 
better-off; the debtor will obtain the value equal to $130 – p, which is positive, and the secured 
creditor will obtain p, which exceeds what he would receive by the foreclosure sale ($120). 
Therefore, as long as there is no obstacle in the bargaining process, inefficient foreclosure will 
be avoided by a voluntary agreement. 
In the real world, however, a variety of obstacles may prevent the parties from negotiating
smoothly. Secured creditor may “hold up” the bargaining process requiring as large a share of 
the going concern surplus (i.e., the difference between the going concern value of the collateral 
and its liquidation value) as possible, using their rights to foreclose as a “threat.” Such a hold-up 
problem may well become more serious when a debtor must negotiate with multiple secured 
creditors in order to realize the going concern surplus (for example, when several creditors have 
security interests with different ranking of priorities in the same asset). Furthermore, the going 
concern value of the collateral is likely to be uncertain and, through the daily management of 
her own business, the debtor may well have acquired private information on it. Such 
asymmetric information may also hinder the parties from bargaining efficiently. 
The procedure of extinguishing security interests may enhance efficiency in those 
circumstances. With this procedure, the debtor can end the costly negotiations by recapturing 
the collateral just by paying its liquidation value to the secured creditors. This “exit option” of 
the debtor can prevent each secured creditor from holding up the bargaining process in order to 
obtain a larger share of the going concern surplus. It can also prevent the bargain from delaying
because of uncertainty on the going concern value of the collateral. 
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Of course, for the procedure of extinguishing security interests to function well, the court 
must be able to assess the liquidation value of the collateral in a fairly accurate and foreseeable 
way. If not, disputes over the liquidation value may have to be settled in a time-consuming
appraisal proceeding, whose cost may be even higher than the negotiation cost which would 
arise if the procedure of extinguishing security interests did not exit. Still, it appears reasonable 
to assume that the court can estimate the liquidation value of the collateral fairly easily, -- or at 
least more easily than the court estimates the going concern value of the collateral. While 
estimating the latter value requires the court to predict future cash flows that the debtor’s 
business will earn using the collateral, estimation of the former value only requires prediction of 
a price of an individual asset. Besides, in predicting such a price, the court can often refer to a 
market price of the same (or, at least, similar) kind of assets in the neighborhood. 
We may better appreciate the procedure of extinguishing security interests by comparing 
it with the treatment of secured claims in Chapter 11 – especially with the procedure so-called 
“cramdown.” Cramdown can also be viewed as an “exit option” of the debtor to recapture the 
collateral by paying the value of the collateral to the objecting secured creditor. There exists an 
important difference between these two procedures, however: While extinguishing security 
interests requires the debtor to make one-time payment of the value of the collateral, cramdown 
permits the debtor to make “deferred cash payments” whose present value is, in the court’s 
estimation, equal to the collateral.14
A possible advantage of cramdown is that the debtor can exercise her exit option even 
when she is too liquidity-constrained to prepare the amount of cash equal to the value of the 
collateral. This apparent benefit is carried with costs, however; that is, cramdown imposes a 
much heavier burden on the court than the procedure of extinguishing security interests. In order 
14 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) .
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to determine whether the requirements of cramdown are satisfied, the court has to estimate not 
only the value of the collateral but also the value of deferred cash payments promised in the 
plan. To estimate the latter value, the court must first examine feasibility of the plan (if the plan 
is not feasible, then the debtor cannot pay the promised deferred payments), and then determine 
a proper interest rate by which to discount the deferred payments, considering a variety of risks 
involved in the reorganized business. These tasks are close to estimating the going concern 
value of the debtor’s business as a whole, which is arguably much more difficult than estimating 
the liquidation value of an individual asset (or assets) used as collateral. 
In the procedure of extinguishing security interests, the task of the court is restricted to 
estimating the liquidation value of the collateral, and it is up to the debtor to prepare this value 
by, say, obtaining a loan in the financial market. Judging from evidences showing many Chapter 
11 debtors fail in reorganization after time-consuming proceedings,15 there seems a good reason 
for the Civil Rehabilitation Act to require the debtor to make one-time payment, though this 
requirement sometimes makes it difficult for some liquidity-constrained debtors to prepare 
necessary amount of cash. 
Although allowing a debtor to extinguish security interests by paying the liquidation
value of the collateral can be beneficial for the purpose of efficient reorganization, it can also 
involve costs. In particular, I examine how this procedure may induce a debtor to overly borrow 
and make an investment in too risky businesses at the expense of existing creditors at the time 
before the debtor files for the Civil Rehabilitation cases. 
Considering this and other difficulties, we cannot be sure that the procedure of 
extinguishing security interests always enhances efficiency. Still, it is worth noting that about 
1,000 firms each year, including dozens of publicly held corporations, file for the Civil 
15
 I compare performance of Chapter 11 with that of the Civil Rehabilitation Act in section II.B, 
infra. 
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Rehabilitation proceedings, and a considerable percentage of these firms succeed in 
reorganization in relatively short periods. 16 These evidences suggest that such a simple 
procedure as the Civil Rehabilitation Act – no automatic stay on secured claims, no cramdown, 
and rather limited intervention of the court – can work fairly effectively. Based on this 
observation, the final part of this Article discusses some policy implications to the U.S. law. In 
particular, I will argue Congress should consider preparing a regime similar to the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act, and allowing each firm to choose this regime as a bankruptcy system which 
will apply to it when it later encounters financial distress, instead of the present Chapter 11 
regime. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces Japanese reorganization laws and their 
treatments of secured claims, putting a special emphasis on the Civil Rehabilitation Act. Part III 
analyzes the procedure of extinguishing security interests and examines its possible social 
benefits. Part IV compares the treatment of secured creditors in the Civil Rehabilitation Act with 
that in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, and analyzes relative advantages of these two 
procedures. Part V examines potential costs of extinguishing security interests. Part VI discusses 
policy implications to the U.S. law and concludes the analysis.  
II. Secured Claims in Japanese Reorganization Laws: With a Special Emphasis on 
Extinguishing Security Interests in the Civil Rehabilitation Act 
This Part describes how secured creditors are treated in Japanese business reorganization
law, especially in the Civil Rehabilitation Act. In fact, Japan has different reorganization 
procedures provided by different statutes. I focus on the Civil Rehabilitation Act both because it 
16
 For performance of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, see section II.B, infra. 
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is by far the most widely used and because it has a novel procedure of restricting secured claims. 
Still, some brief introduction to Japanese reorganization laws will be useful.17
    The Civil Rehabilitation Act (minji saisei ho) 18 was enacted in 1999 and took effect in 
April 2000, as a new general reorganization law in Japan. Before its enactment, Japanese 
reorganization law mainly consisted of two statutes: the Corporate Reorganization Act (kaisha 
kosei ho)19 and the Composition Act (wagi ho),20 the latter of which was repealed by the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act, while the former is still in effect for reorganization of stock corporations.21
Section A briefly explains those two statutes and their treatments of secured claims. Then 
section B describes the basic structure of the Civil Rehabilitation Act. Finally, section C
explains how the Civil Rehabilitation Act treats secured creditors. Japanese reorganization law 
is summarized in Table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
A. Japanese Reorganiation Laws and Their Treatment of Secured Claims
1. Corporate Reorganization Act
The Corporate Reorganization Act22 provides a special reorganization scheme for stock 
corporations (kabushiki gaisha). Stock corporations in Japan had (and have) alternatives to be 
17 This Article focuses on business reorganization law and does not discuss other legal insolvency 
systems (such as consumer-bankruptcy laws). For a summary of Japanese insolvency law, see Kent 
Anderson & Makoto Ito, Insolvency Law for a New Century: Japan’s Revised Framework for 
Economic Failures, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT (Asian Law Center University of 
Washington School of Law, ed., 2002).
18
 Law No.225, Dec. 22, 1999, last amended by Law No.87, July 26, 2005.
19
 Law No.154, Dec. 13, 2002, last amended by Law No.87, July 26, 2005.
20
 Law No.72, Apr. 25, 1922, repealed by Civil Rehabilitation Act, Law No.225, Dec.22, 1999.
21 The other reorganization procedure, corporate arrangement (kaisha seiri), which is provided in 
the Commercial Act (sho ho), Law No.48, Mar.9, 1898, has been rarely used and is being abolished 
by the Corporation Act (kaisha ho), Law No. 86, July 26, 2005, which will take effect early in 2006. 
So I do not examine this procedure at all.
22
 Law No. 172, June 7, 1952, thoroughly revised by Law No.154, Dec.13, 2002, last amended by 
Law No.87, July 26, 2005.
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reorganized either under this Act, or under the Composition Act before 2000 (and the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act after 2000). The Corporate Reorganization Act was thoroughly revised in 
2002,23 but its basic structure remains the same.24
Enacted in the period of occupation by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers after 
the World War II, the Corporate Reorganization Act adopted, and still retains, the basic structure 
of Chapter X of the U.S. Chandler Act.25 In particular, secured creditors, as well as unsecured 
creditors and shareholders, are “captured” in the proceeding. They are prohibited from 
individually enforcing their rights after the commencement of the proceeding, and their claims 
can be modified by the reorganization plan. 
The number of uses of the Corporate Reorganization Act has been small – at most dozens 
each year. 26  One important reason for this is that this Act does not employ a 
debtor-in-possession (DIP) procedure. Rather, courts must appoint administrators (kosei 
kanzai-nin) operating the debtor’s business, and managers of the debtor corporation almost 
always have to leave their positions. This rule obviously discourages debtor corporations from 
petitioning in the first place. Furthermore, when the debtor corporation is insolvent (i.e., when 
its total liabilities exceed its total assets), its shareholders do not have any voting rights to 
approve the reorganization plan. Based on this rule, the entire interests of shareholders are 
usually cancelled without any compensation. Such practice is consistent with the idea of 
23 Corporate Reorganization Act, Law No.154, Dec. 13, 2002.
24
 For an introduction to the Corporate Reorganization Act before 2002 revision, see Tasuku Matsuo, 
Corporate Reorganization, in 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, pt. XIV, ch.8 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 
1997). As for the 2002 revision, see Shinichiro Abe, The Japanese Corporate Reorganization Law of 
2002, 22 AM. BANK. INST. J. 36 (Mar. 2003).
25 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), 
Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549. 
26 For the recent ten years (1994-2003), there were 450 filings (45 per year) for the Corporate 
Reorganization cases. See SAIKO SAIBANSHO JIMU SOKYOKU [Administrative Office of Supreme 
Court of Japan], SHIHO TOKEI NENPO: MINJI-GYOSEI HEN [ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS: 
CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS], each year edition [hereinafter JUDICIAL STATISTICS].
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“absolute priority,” but it has also arguably discouraged many debtors from petitioning –
especially most closely held corporations whose managers are large shareholders at the same 
time.
    As a result, firms using the Corporate Reorganization proceedings have generally been 
restricted to large, often publicly-held corporations. As a matter of practice, most small and 
mid-sized firms had to rely on the Composition Act (as well as private workouts) to be 
reorganized, before enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act.
2. Composition Act 
Until its abolishment in 2000, the Composition Act had been the general reorganization law 
in Japan.27 It provided a procedure available to any types of business entities, such as stock 
corporations, limited liability companies, cooperatives, partnerships, and individuals. In contrast 
to the Corporate Reorganization Act, the Composition Act adopted a DIP procedure, providing 
debtors more incentives to petition. Secured creditors are not “captured” in the Composition 
proceeding, however. While unsecured creditors were prohibited from enforcing their claims, 
secured creditors could freely enforce their interests. Also, while the rights of unsecured
creditors could be modified by a composition plan (wagi) which was accepted by a qualified 
majority of the unsecured creditors and confirmed by the court, the rights of secured creditors 
could not be modified without consent of each claimholder. Using the technical term of 
Japanese insolvency law, secured creditors were “separated” from the proceedings.28
27
 For an introduction and empirical study of the Composition Act, see Theodore Eisenberg & 
Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11?: The Evidence from Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
111 (1994).
28
 Security interests were called “separated rights (betsujo-ken)” in the Composition Act. See 
Composition Act § 43. 
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B. Introduction to the Civil Rehabilitation Act
In the late 1990s, Japanese government undertook a major revision of the entire system of 
insolvency law.29 The revision was motivated to modernize the insolvency laws which had not 
been thoroughly reviewed for nearly a half century. Improvement of the insolvency system was 
also required to deal with the dramatic increase of bankruptcies during the protracted recession
in the 1990s.30 As the first step of a series of insolvency law reforms, the Civil Rehabilitation 
Act was enacted in 1999 and took effect in April 2000, 31  replacing the 78-years-old 
Composition Act. This section describes the very basic structure of the Civil Rehabilitation 
Act,32 and also introduces some figures showing its initial performance. 
As a successor of the Composition Act, the Civil Rehabilitation Act is a general 
reorganization regime available to all types of business entities.33  It also adopts a DIP 
procedure: a rehabilitation debtor (in case of a corporate debtor, the debtor’s manager) continues 
operating her own business during the proceeding, 34  though the court may appoint 
administrators (kanzai nin) replacing the debtor if the court considers such appointment
necessary for rehabilitation of the debtor’s business.35 When the debtor continues managing her 
own business (as is usually the case), the court may, and usually does, appoint supervisors
(kantoku iin) who monitor the debtor.36
29
 For the background of Japan’s insolvency law reforms, see Anderson & Ito, supra note 17; 
Takuya Miyama, Minji saisei ho seitei no keii to ho no gaiyo [Details of the Enactment of the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act and an Outline of the Act], 1171 JURISUTO 6, 6 (2000).
30
 Insolvency filings of both business and non-business sectors increased by over 1,000% during the
ten years between 1991 and 2000. See Anderson & Ito, supra note 17, at 1.
31
 Law No.225, Dec.22, 1999, last amended by Law No.87, July 26, 2005.
32
 Because this Article focuses on secured claims, my introduction to the Civil Rehabilitation Act 
must be only a skeleton. Fortunately, a careful explanation and analysis of the Civil Rehabilitation 
Act is available in English. See Kent Anderson, Small Businesses Reorganizations: An Examination 
of Japan's Civil Rehabilitation Act Considering U.S. Policy Implications and Foreign Creditors' 
Practical Interests, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355 (2001).
33 See Civil Rehabilitation Act [CRA] §2.
34 See CRA §38(1). 
35 See CRA §64. 
36 See CRA §54.
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Like the Composition Act, the basic aim of the Civil Rehabilitation Act is to help the 
debtor to be reorganized by making accommodation with unsecured creditors. Thus, unsecured 
creditors are prohibited from individually enforcing their rights during the proceeding,37 and 
their rights can be modified by a rehabilitation plan (saisei keikaku) that is accepted by a simple 
majority of unsecured creditors (both in amount of claims and in number)38 and confirmed by 
the court.39 The rights of secured creditors, on the other hand, are not affected in principle. In 
contrast to the Composition Act, however, the Civil Rehabilitation Act sometimes imposes
special restrictions on secured claims, as will be explained in the next section. 
After the rehabilitation plan is conclusively confirmed, the court must make a ruling of 
completion of the proceeding if neither administrators nor supervisors were appointed.40 On the 
other hand, if supervisors were appointed (as was usually the case), the court must retain its 
jurisdiction and make the supervisors monitor the plan’s execution. In the latter case, if it 
becomes clear after confirmation that there is no prospect for the plan being consummated, the 
court must make a ruling of discontinuance of the proceeding,41 and the case will usually be 
converted into liquidation. If, on the other hand, the debtor consummates the plan or three years 
have passed since the plan’s confirmation, the court must make a ruling of completion of the 
proceeding.42
So far the Civil Rehabilitation Act has been generally welcomed by the industrial world, as 
it provides a modernized and speedy reorganization procedure.43  Petitions for the Civil 
37 See CRA §§39(1) & 85(1). 
38 See CRA §172-3(1).
39 See CRA §§174-179. 
40
 See CRA §188(1).
41
 See CRA §194.
42
 See CRA §188(2).
43 See, e.g., Teikoku Databank, Ltd., Minji saisei ho seko 4 nenkan no shinsei doko chosa [Research 
on Filings during the 4 years since the Enforcement of the Civil Rehabilitation Act] 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.tdb.co.jp/index.html (“Civil Rehabilitation proceedings certainly go much 
faster than the other reorganization proceedings [such as the Composition and Corporate 
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Rehabilitation cases were 660 in the first nine months (Apr.1 – Dec.31, 2000), and 1,110 (in 
2001), 1,093 (in 2002), 941 (in 2003) and 712 (in 2004) in the successive four calendar years.44
Although these figures appear small compared with the counterparts of Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Act,45 they show a dramatic increase from the figures in the era of the Composition 
Act.46 Since typical Civil Rehabilitation cases involve much larger firms than typical Chapter 
11 cases,47 the importance of the Civil Rehabilitation Act for reorganization practices in Japan 
is greater than the numbers alone suggest. Besides, not only closely held companies but also 
publicly held corporations are reorganized under the Civil Rehabilitation Act. In fact, since the 
enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, publicly held corporations have reorganized under 
this Act more often than under the Corporate Reorganization Act.48 This is probably because 
the DIP procedure of the Civil Rehabilitation Act gives managers more chances to retain their 
jobs, so they have more incentives to petition.
Besides, many debtors obtain confirmation of the rehabilitation plans in relatively short 
periods. According to the survey of Teikoku Databank, Inc., of 2,871 debtor firms which had 
already succeeded or conclusively failed in obtaining confirmation of the rehabilitation plans by 
Reorganization proceedings]”) (translated by the Author).
44 See JUDICIAL STATISTICS, supra note 26, each year. This downward trend probably reflects the 
gradual recovery of the Japanese economy after 2000. 
45
 From April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, there were 10,623 filings for the Chapter 11 business 
reorganization cases. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2002).
46
 The average number of filings for the Composition proceedings each year was 249 in the last ten 
years (1990-99). See JUDICIAL STATISTICS, supra note 26, each year. 
47
 The mean amount of debs of the 3,477 firms which filed for the Civil Rehabilitation proceedings 
from April 1, 2000, to March 31, 2004, was ¥6.5 billion ($65 million). 1,890 (52.0%) of these firms 
had debts less than ¥1 billion ($10 million), and 1,244 (34.2%) had debts less than ¥500 million ($5 
million). See Teikoku Databank, supra note 43, at 2. On the other hand, of 849 debtors that filed for 
the Chapter 11 proceedings in the 23 districts during the twelve months ending in June, 1993, 767 
(90.3%) had debts less than $5 million. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial 
Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 528 (1999).
48
 From April 1, 2000, to March 31, 2004, 77 corporations whose stocks were traded in at least one 
of the stock exchanges in Japan filed for insolvency proceedings. Of those corporations, 54 (70.1%) 
filed for Civil Rehabilitation cases, while 18 (23.4%) filed for the Corporate Reorganization cases. 
The other 5 filed for liquidation. See Teikoku Databank, supra note 43, at 2. 
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the end of March 2004, 2,336 firms (81.4%) had obtained confirmation.49 This confirmation 
rate is remarkably high compared with the counterpart of the U.S. Chapter 11 cases (27%, 
according to a recent survey50). In addition, the mean interval from the petition to the 
confirmation of the rehabilitation plan is about 8 months (249.4 days),51 which also looks better 
than those of Chapter 11.52 Of course, what really matters is not how many plans are confirmed, 
but how many debtors consummate these plans and are successfully reorganized in the end. 
Although a consummation rate is not directly available, the annual reports of the Administrative 
Office of Supreme Court of Japan provide (a) the number of cases that end ed by courts’ rulings
of discontinuance53 or revocation54 after getting confirmation of the plans,55 and (b) the 
number of cases that end ed by courts’ rulings of completion of Civil Rehabilitation 
proceedings,56 each year. For the period from April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2004, the total 
49 See Teikoku Databank, supra note 43, at 3. However, this figure includes 171 cases in which 
courts had already made a ruling of discontinuance after confirmation because they found there were 
no prospects of consummation of the plans. For discontinuance, see supra note 41 and the 
accompanying text. For confirmation rates, see also Ryuji Sonoo, Minji saisei tetsuzuki to saisei 
keikaku no jitsujo to kadai [Real State and Issues of the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings and 
Rehabilitation Plans], 736 NBL 8, 24 (2002) (reporting that the confirmation rate in Tokyo District 
Court during the first two years since enforcement of the Act was 71.2%). 
50 See Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: 
U.S. Trustee Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions, 17-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8 (Feb.1998) 
(Study of 131,089 Chapter 11 filings between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 1995).
51 See Teikoku Databank, supra note 43, at 4. The median is not specifically reported there. Another 
study suggests that it is below 200 days. See Kazuhiro Kosuge & Keiko Tsutsumi, Minji saisei jiken: 
ho seko go ni nenkan no jokyo o hurikaette [Civil Rehabilitation Cases: Reviewing the Two-Years 
Practices after the Enforcement of the Act], 741 NBL 8 (2002) (54.9% of the cases in survey reached 
confirmation of the plans within 200 days after filing). 
52 See Bermant & Flynn, supra note 50 (reporting that the median interval from the petition to 
confirmation was 432 days [14.4 months] for the cases filed during 1997).
53
 For discontinuance of the Civil Rehabilitation proceedings after confirmation of the plans, see 
supra note 41 and the accompanying text. 
54
 The court may make a ruling of revocation of the rehabilitation plan if it finds that the debtor 
obtained confirmation of the plan by an unjust method or otherwise acted fraudulently. See CRA 
§189. Revocation of the plan is extremely rare.
55 In short, figure (a) shows the number of cases that failed in reorganization after getting 
confirmation of the plans.
56 Courts must make a ruling of completion of the proceedings when three years have passed since 
confirmation of the plans. See supra notes 40 & 42.
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figures of (a) and (b) are 281 and 897, respectively.57 The ratio of (b)/(a+b), 76.1%, is 
admittedly not the same as the consummation rate,58 but it implies that the consummation rate 
of Civil Rehabilitation cases is relatively high -- probably higher than that of Chapter 11 cases.59
C. Secured Creditors in the Civil Rehabilitation Act
Now that I have explained the basic structure of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, I turn to its
treatment of secured claims. The general rule of the Civil Rehabilitation Act is that secured 
creditors are “separated” from the proceedings60— they can generally enforce their rights during 
the proceedings, and their claims cannot be modified by the rehabilitation plan. Unlike the 
Composition Act, however, the Civil Rehabilitation Act has two special procedures to restrict 
the rights of secured creditors: (1) temporary stay and (2) the procedure of extinguishing 
security interests. I explain these procedures in order. 
57 See JUDICIAL STATISTICS, supra note 26, each year. 
58
 On one hand, the ratio shown in the text (76.1%) is, by itself, only an estimate of the probability 
for a confirmed plan to survive until completion of the proceeding, rather than the probability for the 
plans to be consummated. Because courts must make a ruling of completion if three years have 
passed since confirmation of plans, see supra note 42 and the accompanying text, it is possible for a 
plan to fail even after the court declares completion of the proceeding. Thus, inferring the 
consummation rate by this ratio may well lead to overestimation. On the other hand, for many Civil 
Rehabilitation cases, the time for a ruling of completion had not yet come by the end of 2004
(because three years had not passed since confirmation of the plans), while many unreasonable plans 
had already ended in discontinuance by that time. In this respect, this ratio (76.1%) is likely to 
underestimate the probability for a confirmed plan to survive until completion of the proceeding. 
The latter effect of underestimation may set off, or even overwhelm, the former effect of 
overestimation.
59
 For consummation rates of Chapter 11 cases, see Nancy Rhein Baldiga, Is this Plan Feasible? An 
Empirical Legal Analysis of Plan Feasibility, 101 COM. L.J. 115, 127 (1996) (reporting that, of 43 
plans in survey, 15 [37.2%] were consummated and 8 [18.6%] were likely to be consummated); 
Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of A Study and 
Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 323-24 (1992) (of 45 cases, 21 [46.7%] were definitely 
consummated and 5 [11.1%] were probably consummated). 
60 Like in the Composition Act, see supra note 28, security interests are called “separated rights 
(betsujo-ken)” in the Civil Rehabilitation Act. See CRA §53.
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1. Tempoary Stay on Secured Claims
In contrast to the U.S. Bankruptcy Act,61 the Civil Rehabilitation Act does not impose 
automatic stay on secured claims. However, it does have a procedure to allow the court to order 
stay on the enforcement of a specific security interest for a “reasonable” period (“temporary 
stay”).62 Because this procedure is an exception to the general rule that the secured claims are 
“separated” from the proceeding, the requirements for the stay order are rigid: courts may order 
temporary stay only if (1) it is in the general interests of creditors, and (2) there is no likelihood 
of causing unreasonable loss to the secured creditor.63 Unlike automatic stay, temporary stay 
must be ordered with respect to a particular security interest, and with a specification of the stay 
period. The stay order automatically loses its effect when the stay period has expired, though the 
court may modify its order to extend the period.64 The objective of temporary stay is explained
to give a debtor a time to negotiate with secured creditors in order to obtain their consents to 
stop the foreclosure sales, or, in case such negotiations break down, a time to petition for
extinguishing security interests, which is described in the next section.65
So far temporary stay has rarely been ordered,66 and the period of stay has been relatively 
short (typically several months).67 Consequently, practitioners seem to think that the effects of 
61 See 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(4) (automatic stay on secured claims).
62 See CRA §31. This procedure is technically called “tanpo-ken no jikkoo tetsuzuki no chushi 
meirei,” whose direct translation would be “discontinuance order of the procedure of enforcement of 
security interests.” I paraphrase the term in order to collate it with “automatic stay” in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Act and to emphasize that stay is not permanent but only for a period specified by the 
court. For further explanation of temporary stay, see Anderson, supra note 32, at 382.
63 See CRA §31(1).
64 See CRA §31(3). 
65
 See RYOICHI HANAMURA, MINJI SAISEI HO YOSETSU [INTRODUCTION TO THE CIVIL 
REHABILITATION ACT] 111-12 (2000).
66
 Of the 1225 cases filed in the 13 main district courts during the first two years after the 
enforcement of the Act, courts ordered temporary stay in 26 cases (2.1%). See Kosuge & Tsutusmi, 
supra note 51, at 13. Of the 613 cases filed in Tokyo District Court during the same period, the stay 
orders were made in 14 cases (2.2%). See Sonoo, supra note 49, at 20-21.
67 See Sonoo, supra note 49, at 20-21 (explaining practices in Tokyo District Court, where the 
period of temporary stay is usually three months); HANAMURA, supra note 65, at 112 (maintaining
that the period of stay should be generally “at most several months.”)
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temporary stay on practices of Civil Rehabilitation are limited.68 Attitude of the courts may be 
changed in the future, however. If the courts come to easily find the requirements for stay to be 
satisfied, and routinely extend the stay periods, then temporary stay will possibly come to work 
very similarly to automatic stay in the U.S. Bankruptcy Act. Because only a few years have 
passed since the Civil Rehabilitation Act took effect, and there have been few publicized cases 
on temporary stay,69 how important effects this procedure will eventually have remains to be 
seen. 
Although temporary stay may become an important device to restrict the rights of secured 
creditors, so far its effect seemingly has been limited to giving debtors relatively short time to 
negotiate with secured creditors. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the more novel and (in my 
opinion) theoretically more interesting restriction on the rights of secured creditors: the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests.
2. Extinguishing Security Interests
After commencement of the proceeding, a debtor can apply to the court for permission to 
extinguish security interests which exist in the debtor’s property.70 To obtain the permission, the 
debtor must specify the property the security interests in which she wants to cancel, and such
68
 For example, one lending officer of Tokai Bank, Inc. observes that “[temporary stay] will not 
have such a serious effect on practices.” TOSHIKI TAKAHASHI, MINJI SAISEI JITSUMU NO TEBIKI [A 
GUIDE TO PRACTICES OF CIVIL REHABILITATION] 90 (2002) (translated by the Author).
69 I find only two publicized cases concerning temporary stay, in both of which petitions of stay 
order are denied. See Anonym v. Anonym, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 274 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., May 28, 
2001) (petition for temporary stay is denied for the reason that the collateral is not necessary for the 
debtor’s business and the temporary stay is not in the best interest of the creditors); Kinki Sangyo 
Credit Ass’n. v. Wada Shoten Corp., 1220 KIN`YU SHOJI HANREI 35 (Osaka App. Ct., Dec. 10, 2004) 
(petition for stay is dismissed because the debtor provides no evidence that there is a prospect for the 
debtor to make accommodation with the secured creditor, so the stay order would be only waste of 
time). 
70 See CRA §§148-153. For further explanation and analysis of this procedure, see Anderson, supra
note 32, at 382-84.
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property must be “indispensable for continuation of the debtor’s business.”71 The debtor must 
submit to the court the amount of cash equal to what she believes to be the value of the property.
72 Note that the debtor cannot pay this value by installments or securities. Only one-time 
payment in cash is acceptable. Such requirement presents a notable contrast to the “cramdown” 
procedure in American law, where a Chapter 11 debtor is allowed to make deferred payments to 
objecting secured creditors.73 I will discuss on this difference later in this Article.74
Secured creditors can, of course, object to the debtor’s valuation, and demand appraisal by 
the court.75 In this case, the court appoints an appraiser (hyoka-nin), and stipulates the value of 
the collateral based on the appraiser’s opinion.76 Then the debtor submits the appraised price, 
which will be distributed to the secured creditor(s). If there are multiple creditors who have 
security interests in the property, the cash will be distributed according to their ranking of 
priorities  determined by the law outside bankruptcy. If the price is more than satisfy the claim of 
each secured creditor, the rest of the cash should be returned to the debtor. If, on the other hand, 
the price is less than satisfy the claim of each secured creditor, then the difference between the 
face value of the secured claim and the cash distributed to the secured creditor will become an 
unsecured claim, and the (former) secured creditor can make a claim of it in the Civil 
Rehabilitation proceeding, provided that the secured loan was made with recourse.77
   How should the appraiser, and eventually the court, assess the value of the collateral? The 
71 See CRA §148(1).
72 See CRA §§148(2)(ii)&152(1).
73 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
74 See section IV.B, infra. 
75 See CRA §149.
76 See CRA §150.
77 What if the secured loan was made without recourse? Because the Civil Rehabilitation Act lacks 
any provision like section 1111(b)(1) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, see infra note 130, I believe that 
the secured creditor cannot make any claim for the deficiency. The assessed value of the collateral is 
all that he can get in this case. I should mention that single project financing (especially single real 
estate financing) is rare in Japan, and lending is typically made with recourse. See Anderson, supra
note 32, at 384.
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relevant section of the Supreme Court Rules of Civil Rehabilitation provides that the property
shall be valued “assuming that the property were disposed of.”78 The policy of this provision is 
explained by the Administrative Office of Supreme Court as follows:
In the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding, a secured creditor can, in principle, freely 
enforce his security interest (see Civil Rehabilitation Act §53), and the procedure of 
extinguishing security interests prevents the secured creditor from exercising this right. 
Therefore, from the point of view that we should assure the secured creditor the value of the 
collateral which he captures, when the collateral is evaluated in the appraisal proceeding, we 
should estimate the value which would be realized if the collateral were actually disposed of 
(i.e., if the secured creditor enforced his security interest).79
According to this explanation, we can view the procedure of extinguishing security interests as a 
scheme enabling the debtor to recapture the collateral just by paying its liquidation value, 
namely, the value which would be realized “if the secured creditor enforced his security 
interest.” 
   Let me give two examples to help understand how this procedure works in practice. 
Example1: Suppose a debtor owes $150 to a creditor and has pledged some real estate, which is 
worth $120 and indispensable for continuation of her business, as collateral. Now suppose the 
debtor has petitioned for the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding and the secured debt is in default. 
Were it not for the procedure of extinguishing security interests, the debtor could not extinguish 
the interest of the secured creditor just by paying the value of the collateral ($120). Rather, his
lien would remain unless either he has received full amount of the face value of his secured 
claim ($150) or the collateral is actually sold by foreclosure. This principle is called 
78
 Civil Rehabilitation Rules §79(1), Supreme Court Rule No.3, Jan. 31, 2000.
79 SAIKO SAIBANSHO JIMU SOKYOKU MINJIKYOKU [ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF SUPREME COURT, 
CIVIL DIVISION], JOKAI MINJI SAISEI KISOKU [ANNOTATION OF CIVIL REHABILITATION RULES] 146 
(2000) (translated by the Author).    
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“indivisibility of security interests (tanpo-ken no hukabun sei),” and has been considered as one 
of the most fundamental principles of the law of security interests in Japan.80 Extinguishing 
security interests has modified this principle. In this procedure, the debtor can pay just $120 to 
the secured creditor and cancel his security interest. The secured creditor will make a claim for 
the deficiency ($30) as an unsecured creditor in the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding.  
Example 2: Suppose that there are three creditors, C1, C2 and C3. Each of them has a claim of 
$100, which is secured by the same asset owned by the debtor, but with different ranking of 
priorities;  C1 has the first mortgage interest, C2 has the second and C3 has the third mortgage 
interest. The asset is now worth $120. If there were not the procedure of extinguishing security 
interests and the debtor paid $100 to C1, then C2’s second mortgage interest would be promoted 
to the first, and C3’s third interest would be promoted to the second. Thus, the debtor eventually 
would have to pay all the debts in order to extinguish these mortgage interests. In contrast, when 
the debtor uses the procedure of extinguishing security interests, she can pay $100 to C1, $20 to 
C2, and none to C3, and extinguish all the mortgage interests. C2 will make a claim of $80, and 
C3 will make a claim of $100, as unsecured creditors, in the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding. 
III. Social Benefits of Extinguishing Security Interests
This Part examines what social benefits (if any) the procedure of extinguishing security 
interests might have. My basic argument is as follows: If there are no obstacles for debtors and 
creditors to negotiate with one another, then we have no need to restrict the rights of secured 
creditors. In such an ideal world, debtors can negotiate with secured creditors and persuade 
them to stop the foreclosure sales, as long as such sales would be inefficient (section A). In the
real world, however, there can exist a variety of obstacles in the negotiation processes (section 
80 See TAKASHI UCHIDA, MINPO III [CIVIL CODE, VOL. III] 355 (1996). 
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B). The procedure of extinguishing security interests can serve social interests in this case. By 
giving the debtor an “option” to redeem the collateral just by paying its liquidation value, this 
procedure can reduce transaction costs and enhance efficiency (section C). 
A. When There Are No Obstacles in the Bargaining Process
1. How Inefficient Foreclosure Could Be Avoided by Negotiation
 I begin my analysis by a simple example. Suppose a debtor81 has borrowed from some 
creditor, and has pledged some asset she owns as collateral. Suppose also that, if the secured 
creditor seizes the collateral and sells it at auction, it will be sold at $L.82 Thus, the liquidation 
value of the collateral is L. On the other hand, we can define the going concern value of the 
collateral, G, as the difference between the value of the debtor’s business that will realize if she 
can continue using the collateral for her business, and the value of her business that will real ize 
if she cannot retain the collateral and must manage her business without using it.83 For example, 
suppose that the debtor’s business will earn future cash flows whose present value is equal to 
$1,000 if the debtor can use the collateral, and will earn future cash flows whose present value 
is $300 if she cannot use it. Then G is $1,000 - 300 = $700. Throughout this Article, I often use 
81
 The terminology of the “debtor” in my analysis requires some explanation. When the 
reorganization proceeding involves an individual debtor, the “debtor” in my analysis, of course, 
means the individual debtor herself. On the other hand, when the reorganization proceeding involves 
a corporate debtor, I assume that the manager of the corporation acts solely for the interests of its 
shareholders. In this case, the “debtor” is an abbreviation of “the group of shareholders of the 
corporate debtor, whose interests are represented by their loyal manager.” My assumption that the 
managers act loyally to their shareholders may be problematic especially for publicly held 
corporations, so obtaining any implication from this analysis should be done with a caution. On the 
other hand, such an assumption appears reasonable for most closely held corporations, where the 
management and the ownership are not separated. 
82 For the purpose of defining L, I do not take into account the possibility that the debtor is the very 
person who values the collateral the most and becomes a winner of the auction. In other words, L is 
defined as the price at which the person, other than the debtor, who values the collateral the most
will bid at auction. 
83
 If the collateral is indispensable for continuation of the debtor’s business and her business will 
liquidate if it is seized and bought by a third party at auction, then “the value of the debtor’s business 
which will realize if she cannot retain the collateral” is equal to the summation of the liquidation 
values of all the assets the debtor owns, except for the collateral.
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“L” and “G” for the abbreviations of “the liquidation value” and “the going concern value,” 
respectively. I focus on an under-secured loan case – that is, the face amount of the secured loan 
is now greater than both L and G.84
Now suppose that the debtor is in default and petitions for the reorganization proceeding. 
Suppose also that the reorganization law (like the Composition Act in Japan or Chapter XI of 
the U.S. Chandler Act) imposes no restriction on the right of the secured creditor. The debtor 
cannot afford to pay full amount of her secured debt, so it may appear that she cannot prevent 
the secured creditor from foreclosing on the collateral. This is not the case, however, if there are 
no obstacles in the bargaining process between the debtor and the secured creditor. 
In particular, suppose first that G is greater than L, so it is efficient for the debtor to 
continue using the collateral. Such an efficient result would easily occur if foreclosure did not 
involve any costs. In this case, when the secured creditor foreclosed on the collateral and sold it
at auction, the debtor would be the highest bidder and could repurchase it.85 In practice, 
however, foreclosure would involve quite a lot of costs. In addition to the time and costs spent 
84
 Such a case is common in Japan these days, where the market of real estate has been sluggish 
since the collapse of the “bubble” economy in early 1990s.
85
 One might be suspicious whether the debtor can repurchase the collateral in the auction even if G 
> L (that means the debtor values the collateral the most); for the debtor in a financial distress may 
be too liquidity-constrained to prepare enough amount of cash to make a successful bid. See Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2386, 2424-25 (2001) (considering the debtor’s liquidity-constraint as a main obstacle 
in the negation among the debtor and the secured creditors). Such difficulty would never happen if 
the financial market were perfect; for the debtor could borrow cash up to G by collateralizing the 
future cash flows that the debtor’s business would earn using the collateral. Because financial market 
is actually not perfect (for example, G may be difficult to observe for potential lenders), however, we 
cannot deny the possibility that the debtor finds it difficult to obtain enough amount of cash to 
repurchase the collateral. How often such cases occur is an empirical question. 
    Whether or not the problem of liquidity-constraint is serious, however, it is not the problem that 
the procedure of extinguishing security interests can (or tries to) solve. This is because this 
procedure demands the debtor to make one-time payment of the value of the collateral, see section 
II.C.2, supra. Thus, if the debtor is so liquidity-constrained that she cannot obtain cash enough to 
win the auction, then it is highly probable that she cannot use the procedure of extinguishing security 
interests, either. Extinguishing security interests must be understood as a scheme to deal with 
problems other than liquidity-constraint of the debtor, which will be discussed in this and the next 
section. Whether and how the law should try to solve the problem of liquidity-constraint is another 
question, to which I will turn in Part IV, infra. 
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in the seizure and auction process, the fact that the debtor’s property is being foreclosed would
put the debtor’s business in a very uncertain position. In particular, if the property that is 
indispensable for continuation of the debtor’s business is seized and bought by a third party at 
auction, then the debtor’s business will be hopeless to continue. Such an uncertainty may well 
make it hard for the debtor to have business relationships with others (employees, suppliers and 
customers, and so on) while the auction is in progress. This may well be so even if the debtor is 
truly the person who values the property the most (i.e., G > L), for she may find it hard to make 
others believe this is the case. Thus, the value of the debtor’s business (and also G) may 
substantially diminish during the auction process.
Accordingly, as long as G>L, the debtor has a strong incentive to negotiate with the 
secured creditor and try to obtain his consent to stop the foreclosure sale. And she can always do 
so if there exit no obstacles in the bargaining process or, more particularly, if there is no 
information asymmetry between the debtor and the secured creditor and if they can negotiate 
with each other without any costs. In such an ideal world, as long as G is greater than L, the 
debtor can always promise the secured creditor to pay L plus some share of the going concern 
surplus.86 The secured creditor has an incentive to accept this offer, because it will give him 
more than what he would get if he enforced his security interest (i.e., L). The debtor also has an 
incentive to make this offer, for by doing so she can retain the collateral without spending any 
costs in the foreclosure sale. Thus, we expect the parties to get to an agreement.87
86 More specifically, the debtor will promise to pay L + a (G-L), where 0 =< a = < 1. How much 
share of the going concern surplus the debtor offers to the secured creditor in exchange for his 
promise to stop foreclosure will depend on the relative bargaining powers of the debtor and the 
secured creditor, which are determined by such factors as time preference of each party.  
87
 This is a simple application of Coase Theorem – that is, if there are no “transaction costs,” an 
efficient result will always occur regardless of the choice of legal rules. See Ronald H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). A non-cooperative bargaining model, in which 
two parities negotiate with each other under perfect information, also predicts that the parties will 
come to an agreement instantaneously. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING 
AND MARKETS, Chap.3 (1990). Douglas Baird and Randal Picker used the bargaining model to 
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Next suppose that G is less than L. In this case, the debtor cannot afford to make a payment
that will satisfy the secured creditor, so the collateral will be seized and bought by a third party 
at auction. This result is also desirable, for the debtor is not the person who values the collateral 
the most, so she should no longer retain it. 
In sum, as long as there is no obstacle in the bargaining process, foreclosure will be 
avoided by a voluntary negotiation between the debtor and the secured creditor if and only if 
such foreclosure is inefficient (i.e., if and only if G <L). We do not need the procedure of 
extinguishing security interests in this case, nor do we need any other scheme to restrict the 
rights of secured creditors. 
2. Practices in the Composition Act
Although the above analysis relies on the ideal assumption of “zero transaction costs,” it 
still has something to do with the reality. As was explained in section II.A.2, above, the 
Composition Act, which had provided a general reorganization scheme for Japanese firms until 
2000, did not impose any restriction on the rights of secured creditors. That did not necessarily 
mean, however, that a Composition debtor could not avoid foreclosure unless she paid every 
secured creditor the full amount of the face value of every secured debt. In fact, the debtor often 
made an agreement with each secured creditor to avoid the foreclosure sale. In such an 
agreement, the debtor promised to pay the secured creditor full or part of her secured debt, often 
by installments, and the secured creditor in turn promised to refrain from enforcing his right, as 
long as the debtor kept paying as promised. Such an agreement was often called “security 
agreement (tanpo-ken kyotei),” “payment agreement (bensai kyotei),” or “separated-right 
analyze the bargaining process between a debtor (more precisely, a corporate debtor’s 
owner-manager) and a secured creditor whose claim is secured by the whole assets of the debtor.  
See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991). 
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agreement (betsujo-ken kyotei).”88 Inefficient foreclosure sales, and inefficient liquidation of 
the debtors’ businesses caused by them, could be avoided through such agreements, at least in 
some circumstances.
B.  When There Are Obstacles in the Bargaining Process
1. Parties May Not Negotiate Efficiently
So far I have explained that, if there are no obstacles in the bargaining process, the debtor 
can always bargain with the secured creditors to avoid inefficient foreclosure sales. In realty, 
however, a variety of obstacles may prevent the parties from bargaining smoothly. 
We can think of several reasons for the parties to have difficulty in reaching an efficient 
agreement. One possible reason is that the debtor and the secured creditor(s) disagree on the 
value of the collateral. Intuitively, it seems more likely that the parties have different estimation
on the going concern value (G) of the collateral than on its liquidation value (L). Of course, 
estimating L is also speculative, but, after all, it only requires the parties to predict the price of 
an individual asset, not the value of the debtor’s whole business. In contrast, estimation of G
requires the parties to predict the future cash flows that the debtor ’s business will earn with (and 
without) using the collateral,89 and to calculate the present value of those cash flows. Thus, 
estimating G actually requires estimating the value of the debtor’s business itself, and evaluation 
of a financially distressed firm is arguably much harder than evaluation of an individual asset.90
88
 Although the Composition Act prohibited a debtor from paying to any unsecured creditors outside 
the Composition proceeding, it allowed the debtor to pay (or promise to pay) secured creditors in 
order to redeem the collateral. For practice of security agreements in the era of the Composition Act, 
see TOZAI TOSAN JITSUMU KENKYU KAI [STUDY GROUP ON THE INSOLVENCY PRACTICES IN TOKYO 
AND OSAKA], WAGI [COMPOSITION] 283-90 (1988).
89 Note that G is defined as the difference between the value which the debtor’s business will earn 
with using the collateral and the value which the debtor’s business will earn without using it. See 
supra note 83 and the accompanying text. 
90
 For difficulty of evaluating financially distressed firms, see Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. 
Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85,
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Furthermore, through daily management of her own business, the debtor may well acquire a 
variety of information on the value of her own business (and also G), which is difficult for 
creditors to obtain. Such asymmetry of information may well make it difficult for the parties to 
reach an agreement. 
For example, suppose that the debtor and the secured creditor basically agree on the value 
of L, but they have different evaluation on G, and the debtor has relatively more accurate 
information on it. In this case, the debtor will negotiate with the secured creditor in order to 
redeem the collateral if G is greater than L. But in this negotiation, the debtor may well pretend 
that G is as close to L as possible. This is because the fact that G is much greater than L means 
that the debtor can afford to make a payment (p) much higher than L to the secured creditor for 
compensation of stopping the foreclosure sale, so she may really be demanded high p by the 
secured creditor. Having such a strategy of the debtor in mind, the secured creditor may try to 
“screen out” the debtor with high G from debtors with low G. More particularly, he may 
demand some very high price at the beginning of the negotiation, and gradually lower the 
demand prices as the negotiation goes on. The debtor with higher G has greater stake to lose 
when the negotiation is prolonged, so she tends to compromise with a higher price in an earlier 
period of the negotiation. On the other hand, the debtor with lower G does not easily 
compromise, and makes an agreement in a later period of the negotiation at a lower price. This 
means that, as the true value of G is closer to L, bargaining tends to delay longer.91
Another possible reason to make a negotiation process costly is that the debtor may have to 
negotiate with multiple secured creditors to realize G. For example, several creditors have 
security interests in the same asset, or different creditors have security interests in different 
89 (1995).
91
 Strategic bargaining as described in the text can be formerly analyzed with a non-cooperative 
bargaining model under asymmetric information. For a review of literatures in this field, see John 
Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (1993). 
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assets that work together and produce a synergy. In these cases, G will be destroyed if even one 
of those creditors enforces his security interest. Such a situation appears fairly common, indeed.
Empirical studies, both in Japan and in the United States, suggest that even small firms often 
obtain secured loans from a quite few creditors.92
Arguably, the more secured creditors a debtor has to negotiate with, the more likely it 
becomes that bargaining is prolonged. This is because each secured creditor has an incentive to 
“hold up” the bargaining process in the hope of getting a larger share of G. Each creditor will 
demand as high a price as possible in exchange for refraining from the foreclosure, using his 
power to enforce his security interest as a “threat.”93
2. Empirical Evidences Suggesting Negotiation Could Be Costly
   So far I have pointed out several obstacles that may prevent the parties from bargaining 
smoothly. An important question is: How serious are these problems in practice? Concerning 
this question, two kinds of evidences in Japan may be suggestive. One is about comparison 
between the performance of the Composition Act and that of the Civil Rehabilitation Act. 
92
 According to the survey of Japan Small Business Research Institute conducted in 2002, over 40% 
of the firms with 20 or less employees have transactions with three or more financial institutions. 
Also, over 30 % of the firms with 101 – 300 employees have transactions with six or more financial 
institutions. See JAPAN SMALL BUSINESS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WHITE PAPER ON SMALL AND 
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN 2003: THE ROAD TO REGENERATION AND CREATION OF AN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SOCIETY 145, Fig. 2-3-12 (2003), available at
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/hakusyo/h15/download/2003haku_eng.pdf. Of course, not all of the 
claims of these financial institutions are secured. But the same study also reports that more than 80% 
of the loans to those small firms by their main banks are secured. Id. at 142, Fig.2-3-5. Judging from 
these figures, even small firms in Japan have a quite few secured creditors. Small firms in the United 
States also obtain secured loans from multiple creditors, according to the survey by Ronald Mann. 
See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 657 (1997). 
93
 Recent literatures analyzing bargaining among multiple parties with a non-cooperative
game-theoretic model predict that bargaining may delay even under perfect information. See 
Hungbin Cai, Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information, 93 J.ECON. THEORY
260 (2000); Hungbin Cai, Inefficient Markov Perfect Equilibria in Multilateral Bargaining, 22 ECON. 
THEORY 583 (2003). This result presents an interesting contrast with a two-party bargaining model, 
which predicts that bargaining will reach an agreement instantaneously. See OSBORNE & 
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 87. 
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Generally speaking, the Composition proceedings, which lacked any restriction on secured 
claims, had less petitions94 and lower confirmation rates,95 and took longer time from petitions 
to confirmation of the plans, than the Civil Rehabilitation proceedings. 96  Another is a
questionnaire survey to those who had experienced in serving as Composition administrators.97
More than 75 percent of the respondents answered that they thought some restrictions on the 
rights of secured creditors were needed in the Composition proceedings.98 These evidences, 
though far from determinative,99 are consistent with the hypothesis that debtors sometimes have 
difficulties in being reorganized if they have to negotiate with secured creditors with no legal 
94
 Petitions for the Composition proceedings were, on average, about 250 each year, see supra note 
46, while petitions for the Civil Rehabilitation proceedings were 700 - 1,000 each year, see supra
note 44 and the accompanying text.  
95
 According to the survey of the Research Group on Empirical Study of Composition Proceedings
(headed by Yoshimitsu Aoyama, Professor of Tokyo University), of the 347 Composition cases filed 
in the eight major district courts in Japan in 1982 and 1987, 189 cases (54.5%) were confirmed, 
while 134 were withdrawn, 14 denied and 9 discontinued. See Shintaro Hayashi, Wagi tetsuzuki no 
shinko [Progress of Composition Proceedings], in WAGI HO NO JISSHO TEKI KENKYU [EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES OF THE COMPOSITION ACT] 61, 61-62 (Yoshimitsu Aoyama ed., 1988). See also Eisenberg 
& Tagashira, supra note 27, for summary and analysis of this survey in English. Such a confirmation 
rate was considerably lower than that of Civil Rehabilitation cases, see supra note 49 and the 
accompanying text. 
96
 According to the empirical study on Composition cases cited in 95, supra, the average period of 
time between petition and plan confirmation was 214 days for 1982 cases and 271 days for 1987 
cases. See Hayashi, supra note 95, at 64. These periods were not necessarily longer than that of Civil 
Rehabilitation cases (249.4 days), see supra note 51 and the accompanying text, but they showed a 
trend of delaying. Indeed, such a trend appears to have continued during 1980s and 90s, and 
bankruptcy-law practitioners agree that typical Civil Rehabilitation cases go substantially faster than 
Composition cases. See comment by Takashi Sonoo, a Judge of Tokyo District Court in: Makoto Ito, 
et.al., Zadankai: Tokyo chisai ni okeru minji saisei tetsuzuki no jitsujo [Panel Discussion: Real States 
of Practices of Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings in Tokyo District Court], 746 NBL 8, 15-16 (2002)
(saying that Composition cases generally took one year).
97
 Composition administrators were appointed by courts and supervised the debtors’ management. 
Many of them were lawyers practicing in business reorganizations.  
98
 Toyohisa Isobe & Manabu Wagatsuma, Wagi kanzai-nin ni taisuru ankeeto chosa no kekka
[Results of the Questionnaire Survey to Composition Administrators], in WAGI HO NO JISSHO TEKI 
KENKYU [EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE COMPOSITION ACT] 259, 294 (Yoshimitsu Aoyama ed., 1988).
99
 The Composition Act had long been criticized by many practitioners and scholars for many 
reasons, and the Civil Rehabilitation Act was enacted in order to correct these problems. See 
Anderson, supra note 32, at 362-63. Thus, it is not clear to what extent the better performance of the 
Civil Rehabilitation Act is attributed to the adoption of the procedure of extinguishing security 
interests. As for the questionnaire to Composition administrators, we can hardly deny the possibility 
that these people were sympathetic to debtors and hoped the debtors’ businesses to be reorganized, 
whether or not such reorganization would be socially desirable. 
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restrictions on enforcement of secured claims. In the next section, I analyze how the procedure 
of extinguishing security interests in the Civil Rehabilitation Act may mitigate such difficulties.
C.  Social Benefits of Extinguishing Security Interests
 This section analyzes how the procedure of extinguishing security interests may enhance 
efficiency. The argument is basically that, by giving the debtor an option to “exit” out of the 
negotiation with the secured creditors just by paying the liquidation value of the collateral, this 
procedure can reduce the transaction costs which might otherwise arise in the negotiation
between the debtor and the secured creditors. Careful analysis is needed, however, to see when 
and how this procedure can work in this way.100
1. When and How Extinguishing Security Interests Enhances Efficiency
I conjecture that extinguishing security interests is the most beneficial when the following 
conditions are satisfied. First, the liquidation value of the collateral (L) is fairly certain: the 
debtor and the secured creditor basically agree not only on how much L is, but also on how the 
court would evaluate L in the appraisal proceeding.101 Second, the debtor has relatively accurate 
information on the going concern value of the collateral (G). Third, the debtor does not suffer 
from serious liquidity-constraint: she is able to prepare the amount of cash equal to L, even 
though she cannot pay full of her secured debt, which can be greater than both G and L.102
  If all the above conditions are satisfied, extinguishing security interests functions nicely. 
For example, suppose that both the debtor and the secured creditor agree on L and can verify 
100
 The analysis in this section focuses on allocation efficiency; that is, how the collateral is 
allocated for more efficient use with lower costs at the time of reorganization. Extinguishing security 
interests may also affect investment efficiency, however, which I will analyze in Part V, infra.
101
 As I explained earlier, when the parties do not agree on L, it is assessed by the court based on the 
opinion of the court-appointed appraiser. See supra note 75-76 and the accompanying text. 
102
 I examine the reasonableness of the first two conditions later in this section. The third condition 
will be discussed in section IV.B, infra. 
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this value to the court, but only the debtor knows G. In this case, if the debtor values G more 
than L, then she will exercise her option to pay L to the secured creditor and extinguish his 
security interest, saving transaction costs which might arise if she had to negotiate with him
under information asymmetry on G. If, on the other hand, the debtor values G less than L, then 
she will not exercise her option because she has no incentive to pay more than the value of the 
collateral for her business. In the latter case, the secured creditor will enforce his security 
interest and realize L. We will obtain efficient results in both cases. 
Extinguishing security interests is likely to be more beneficial when the debtor has to 
negotiate with multiple secured creditors. For example, suppose different creditors have security 
interests with different ranking of priorities in the same asset. In this case, bargaining may be 
costly even when there is no uncertainty over either L or G, for each secured creditor may hold 
up the bargaining process requiring the larger share of G.103 We can avoid such costly 
negotiation by giving the debtor an option to exit out of the negotiation just by paying those 
creditors L in total, which will be distributed according to their ranking of priorities.
For the procedure of extinguishing security interests to perform well, however, the court
must be able to evaluate L in a fairly accurate and foreseeable way. If, for example, the court 
erroneously estimates L as $40 though the true value of L is $50, then the debtor who values G
more than $40 but less than $50 will exercise her exit option and inefficient ly continue using the 
collateral. Besides, extinguishing security interests may work poorly if it is difficult for the 
parties to foresee how the court will evaluate L in the appraisal proceeding. This can happen 
even when the parties agree on the value of L itself. The debtor and the secured creditor 
naturally discussed on the value of the collateral at the time when they originally negotiated on 
conditions of the secured loan, so it is not surprising that they have a fairly common idea on L. 
103 See supra notes 92-93 and the accompanying text. 
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But they may still disagree on how the third party, the court, will evaluate L. Such uncertainty 
may make it difficult for the parties to reach an agreement, and disputes over L may have to be 
settled in litigation (more particularly, in the appraisal proceeding). Then the litigation costs 
might be higher – perhaps much higher – than the negotiation costs which would arise if the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests did not exist and the debtor had to negotiate with 
the secured creditor to avoid the foreclosure sale, like in the era of the Composition Act.104
Whether and to what extent the court can estimate L in an accurate and foreseeable manner
is an empirical question, which is beyond the purpose of this Article. But intuitively, it appears 
reasonable to assume that the parties and the court can agree on the value of L fairly easily – at 
least more easily than they agree on G. As I pointed out in the last section,105 L is only the value 
of an individual asset, which is arguably easier to estimate than the value of a financially 
distressed firm itself, which is necessary to estimate G. Besides, in order to evaluate L, the 
parties and the court can often refer to a market price of the same (or, at least, similar) kinds of 
assets in the neighborhood.106
104
 Bargaining under the Composition Act was likely to be costly for such reasons as uncertainty 
over G or multiplicity of secured creditors. See section III.B.1, supra. Still, there was no uncertainty 
over how the court would decide a case if the negotiation broke down and the dispute was brought to
the court; that is, parties were certain that the court would permit the secured creditor to foreclose on 
the collateral whenever the debtor was in default. This aspect of certainty might sometimes make the 
negotiation costs under non-existence of the procedure of extinguishing security interests even 
cheaper than the negotiation costs under existence of it. 
105 See supra note 90 and the accompanying text. 
106 Concerning the difficulty of evaluation discussed in the text, readers may suggest one alternative 
solution: Why not an auction?  Rather than relying on the court estimating the liquidation value of 
the encumbered asset, the Civil Rehabilitation Act (or any other bankruptcy regimes) could simply 
allow secured creditors to enforce their rights and sell the asset in the auction process and, at the 
same time, allow the debtor to participate in the auction. The debtor can offer the highest price and 
recapture the asset if, and only if, she is the person who can use the asset most efficiently (that is, if 
G > L).  Such an auction regime may have its own fault, however, as was explained in section 
III.A.1, supra. One difficulty is that an auction will put the debtor’s business in a very uncertain 
position. If the asset indispensable for the debtor’s business is seized and bought by a third party in 
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The second important condition for the procedure of extinguishing security interests to 
function efficiently is that the debtor has fairly accurate information on G. If not, then this 
procedure may be inefficiently used: the debtor may exercise her option to extinguish security 
interests even when G < L, or fail to exercise it even when G > L. Still, the assumption that the 
debtor has good information on G – at least compared with the secured creditors and the court –
also appears fairly reasonable. Through the daily management of her own business, the debtor 
naturally has acquired various information on the value of her business (and also G), which is 
difficult for others to obtain. 
2. Extinguishing Security Interests As a Liability Rule
We may better appreciate the procedure of extinguishing security interests when we view 
the auction process, then the debtor’s business will be hopeless to continue. Such an uncertainty may 
well make it hard for the debtor to have business relationships with others while the auction is going 
on. This may well be so even if the debtor is truly the person who values the asset the most, for she 
will find it hard to make others believe this is the case. Thus, the value of the debtor’s business may 
substantially diminish during the auction process. 
  One might find another difficulty in the auction regime; that is, the debtor in the reorganization 
process may be so liquidity-constrained that she cannot pay the value of the asset, even though she 
can use the asset more efficiently than any others.  Because the Civil Rehabilitation Act now 
demands the debtor to make one-time payment of the value of the asset to extinguish security 
interests in it, however, liquidity-constraint cannot be a reason to prefer the procedure of 
extinguishing security interests (as is now employed) over the auction regime. Of course, we can 
conceive a regime that allows the debtor to make deferred payments, whose present value equals the 
value of the asset, and to extinguish security interests. Such a regime might cause a serious problem 
of evaluation, however – that is, who values the present value of deferred payments, and how? I will 
discuss the trade-off of liquidity-constraint and evaluation in Part IV.  
So far I have supposed that, in the auction process, the encumbered assets are directly at auction. 
This is the case in the real auction process under laws of security interests both in Japan and in the 
United States. In contrast, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried propose a novel auction regime which
would, they argue, solve the problems of liquidity-constraint and evaluation simultaneously. I will 
discuss their proposal later in this Article. See infra note 154. 
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it from a perspective of property rules and liability rules.107 As is widely known, property rules 
protect entitlements by deterring nonconsensual taking, while liability rules compensate 
entitlement holders if a nonconsensual taking occurs.108 Upon default of the secured debt, the
secured creditor has an entitlement to foreclose on the collateral and use its proceeds to satisfy 
his secured claim. Such an entitlement is protected by a property rule outside the Civil 
Rehabilitation proceeding: in order to stop the foreclosure, the debtor must negotiate with the 
secured creditor and obtain his consent (unless the debtor pays the full amount of the face value 
of her secured debt, which, I assume, is greater than the value of the collateral). In contrast, 
when the debtor enters the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding, she can “take” his security interest 
just by paying “damages” equal to the liquidation value of the collateral, which the secured 
creditor would receive if he enforced his entitlement. 
According to the recent economic analysis on the property rules and liability rules, one 
important virtue of the liability rules is to allow the court to “harness” the private information 
which the non-entitlement holder naturally holds. 109  This is what extinguishing security 
interests aims to do. By leaving the debtor to choose whether or not to exercise her option, we 
can harness the private information that the debtor has on G.
3. Actual Use of Extinguishing Security Interests
    So far the actual use of extinguishing security interests has been rare. Of the 1225 cases 
filed in the thirteen main district courts from Apr. 1, 2000 to Mar. 31, 2002, courts ordered 
107 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
108 See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability 
Rules, 32 J.LEGAL STUD.121, 121 (2003).
109 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996). See also Richard R. W. Brooks, The Relative Burden 
of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 267 (2002) (suggesting that benefits of liability rules depend on the court’s ability to estimate 
damages accurately). 
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permission of extinguishing security interests only in 10 cases (0.82%).110 Like in the era of the 
Composition Act, debtors often rely on voluntary agreements (so-called “security agreements”)
with secured creditors in order to avoid foreclosure,111 rather than apply to the courts for 
permission of extinguishing security interests. We should not underestimate the value of this 
procedure by the number of actual uses alone, however. If L is not subject to severe uncertainty 
and parties can agree at what price the court is likely to assess L, then they will settle a dispute 
by a voluntary agreement, rather than spend costs in the appraisal proceeding. The real benefit 
of extinguishing security interests is to set up the baseline of the voluntary negotiation and 
reduce transaction costs. Thanks to the exit option of the debtor, the share of the secured creditor 
from the negotiation is fixed to L, so the parties only have to agree on the value of L. We no 
longer have to worry that bargaining may be delayed either because the parties do not agree on 
G or because the secured creditor holds up the bargaining process in order to obtain a higher 
share of G.112
IV. Comparison with Cramdown in Chapter 11
This Part compares the procedure of extinguishing security interests in the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act with the manner of treating security interests in Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Act, especially with the “cramdown” procedure.113 Section A introduces the 
structure of Chapter 11 to the extent necessary to make a meaningful comparison with the Civil 
110
 Kosuge & Tsutsumi, supra note 51, at 13.
111 For security agreements made in the era of the Composition Act, see supra note 88 and the 
accompanying text. As for the practices of security agreements in the Civil Rehabilitation Act, see
JIGYO SAISEI KENKYU KIKO [JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS RECOVERY], SAISEI KEIKAKU 
JIREI SHU [CASES OF REHABILITATION PLANS] 20-23 (2002).
112
 Alternatively, however, the small number of uses of the procedure may suggest that many 
debtors are so severely liquidity-constrained that they cannot use it in the first place. I will discuss on 
the matter of liquidity-constraint in section IV.B, infra. 
113 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b). 
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Rehabilitation Act.114 Then section B analyzes relative advantages of these two rules.
A. Secured Creditors in Chapter 11: Cramdown in Particular
1. Overview of Chapter 11 and Cramdown 
Readers who are familiar with American bankruptcy law may find similarity between the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests on one hand, and cramdown in Chapter 11, on the 
other. Generally speaking, extinguishing security interests allows a debtor to “bifurcate” her 
secured debts into two parts: (1) the part covered by the value of the collateral and (2) the part 
not covered by it. The debtor has an “option” to pay just the first part and make the second part 
of her debt unsecured. 
Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, bifurcation of secured claims is not only allowed but also 
required, according to section 506(a).115 For example, if a debtor owes a creditor $150 and has 
collateralized one asset whose value is $120, then the creditor’s claim is treated as a secured 
claim only to the extent of the value of the collateral, $120, and the rest of his claim ($30) is
treated as an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding– aside from so-called “section 
1111(b) election.”116 Furthermore, a Chapter 11 debtor has an option to pay just the value of the 
collateral ($120) and retain it for her own business notwithstanding the objection of the secured 
creditor, at least in some circumstances. Cramdown can work in this way, as is described 
114
 For a concise and analytical guide to the American bankruptcy law, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE 
ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (3rd ed. 2001).
115
 An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an 
interest … is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s 
interest in such property,… and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such 
creditor’s interest … is less than the amount of such allowed claim. 
11 U.S.C. §506(a). For bifurcation, see David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J.1 (1996).
116 Things may become somewhat complicated in Chapter 11 because a secured creditor can elect to 
have his entire claim treated as secured, according to section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. See 11 
U.S.C. §1111(b). This option to elect, however, does not protect the interest of the secured creditor 
as strongly as it first appears. I discuss on this election in infra note 126. 
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below.117
During the Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor may file a plan of reorganization,118 which 
divides the creditors into various classes and proposes a treatment for each class. If the plan is 
accepted by a qualified majority voting of each impaired class, 119  and satisfies other 
requirements of section 1129(a),120 then the court must confirm the plan and terms of each 
claim will be modified accordingly.121 In a typical case, however, each secured creditor consists 
of one class by himself.122 Thus, the debtor usually has to rely on section 1129(b), rather than 
1129(a), to obtain confirmation of the plan over the objection of any secured creditor. Section 
1129(b) provides that the court must confirm the plan despite the fact that some impaired classes 
are against the plan, provided that several conditions are satisfied. This procedure is commonly 
called “cramdown.”123 For a plan to be crammed down on a dissenting class, it must meet all 
the requirements of section 1129(a) except for paragraph (8), which requires the plan to be 
accepted by each impaired class. Besides, the plan must not “unfairly discriminate,” and must 
117
 Douglas Baird and Randall Picker analyzed Chapter 11 with a model of non-cooperative 
bargaining between the debtor and the secured creditor. See Baird & Picker, supra note 87. One 
difference between their analysis and mine is that they characterized the “new value exception” as an 
exit option of the debtor, while my analysis below characterizes cramdown as the debtor’s option, 
though I admit that the new value exception will increase the debtor’s availability of her option. See 
infra note 132 and the accompanying text. 
118 See 11 U.S.C. §1121(a). 
119
 A class of claims is deemed to accept the plan if the plan is accepted by at least two-thirds in 
amount and more than one-half in number of the claims of the class. See 11 U.S.C. §1126(c).
120 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(a). 
121 See 11 U.S.C. §1141.
122
 To be classified into the same class, claims must be “substantially similar.” See 11 U.S.C. 
§1122(a). If creditors have liens on different assets, or, have liens on the same asset but with 
different ranking of priorities, their claims are generally deemed not substantially similar and must 
be classified into separate classes. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1122.03[4][c] (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. Rev. 2004) (citing cases).
123
 For cramdown in general, see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, ¶¶ 1129.04-06; 
Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the Bankruptcy Code, 53 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979). For cramdown on secured creditors, see Charles D. Booth, The 
Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1986);
Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1496 (1993).
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be “fair and equitable,” with respect to each dissenting class.124 Section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides 
specific requirements the plan must meet to be “fair and equitable” to a dissenting class of 
holders of secured claims. Using the example in the last paragraph, if the debtor wants to retain 
the collateral over the objection of the secured creditor, the plan must, in principle,125 (1) retain 
the lien securing the allowed secured claim and (2) promise the secured creditor the deferred 
payments whose value is at least equal to the value of the collateral, that is, $120.126
2. Some Complication Concerning Debtors’ Availability of Cramdown Options
In fact, there is some uncertainty about the availability of cramdown as an ext option of the 
debtor. This is because, while a debtor in the Civil Rehabilitation Act can apply for 
extinguishing security interests in her own decision at any time before the end of the proceeding, 
a Chapter 11 debtor can ask for cramdown at the stage of confirmation of the plan only if all the 
requirements of section 1129(b) are satisfied. Among others, the plan must be accepted by at 
least one impaired class, without including any acceptance by any insider. 127  In some 
circumstances, this requirement may give some secured creditors an effective veto power 
against cramdown.
124 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1). 
125 Alternatively, the plan must provide for realization by the secured creditor the “indubitable 
equivalent” of his secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
126 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (requiring that each holder of the secured claim receive 
“deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such 
property”). 
In addition, if the secured creditor has made a “section 1111(b) election,” see supra note 116, 
such deferred payments must also total at least $150 in our example. The latter requirement is only 
nominal, however, not in a sense of present value. For example, a plan promising to pay the secured 
creditor $10 for 15 years satisfies this requirement. Furthermore, if the secured creditor makes 
section 1111(b) election, he can no longer make a claim as an unsecured creditor for the deficiency 
($30). Overall, making the section 1111(b) election is not necessarily advantageous for secured 
creditors. As for the circumstances where the secured creditors find such election meritorious, see
JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 573-74 (1996); 
Theodore Eisenberg, The Underseured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 931, 934-40 (1985).
127 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(10)&(b)(1). For definition of an insider, see 11 U.S.C. §101(31).
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For instance, suppose a corporate debtor has (1) one secured creditor having a claim of 
$150 secured by some property worth $120, (2) many unsecured creditors whose total claims 
amount to $20, and (3) one shareholder who is also a manger (thus an insider). No other 
claim/interest–holders exist in the debtor corporation. In this case, the secured creditor’s 
allowed secured claim is $120, which consists of one class by himself, and his deficiency claim, 
$30, becomes an unsecured claim. If the court requires this deficiency claim to be classified into 
the same class as other unsecured claims (as a number of Circuit Courts do128), then the 
deficiency claim consists of the majority of the class of unsecured creditors. Consequently, if the 
secured creditor objects to the plan, both as a holder of an allowed secured claim and as a holder 
of an unsecured (deficiency) claim, then the plan won’t be accepted by any class other than the 
insider’s class (i.e., the owner-manager). Thus, cramdown is not available.
Cramdown may be available even in the above example if the plan can classify the 
deficiency claim into a different class from the class of other unsecured creditors. Indeed, the 
Seventh Circuit Court not only allows but also requires such separate classification,129 at least 
when a secured loan was originally made without recourse and the deficiency claim is created 
by section 1111(b)(1).130 If the deficiency claim is treated in this way, the debtor (or, more 
accurately, the debtor’s owner-manager) has a chance to obtain acceptance of the plan by the 
class of unsecured creditors (other than the deficiency-claim-holder). Even in this case, however, 
the secured creditor will reject the plan as a holder of the deficiency claim (which now consist 
of one class by himself), and then, section 1129 (b)(2)(B) – the absolute priority rule – will 
128 See, e.g., Barakat v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia (In re Barakat), 99 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (citing cases); Lumber Exchange Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New 
York (In re Luber Exchange Bldg. Ltd), 968 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1992).
129 See In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1994).
130
 In Chapter 11, a secured creditor is treated as if he had recourse against the debtor even when the 
secured loan was made without recourse. See 11 U.S.C. §1111(b)(1)(A). For details of inclusion of 
this apparently peculiar provision into the statute and critical analysis of it, see Eisenberg, supra note 
126.  
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stand before the debtor’s owner-manager as an obstacle to cramdown.131 Because the class of 
the deficiency claim rejects the plan, the plan must provide that the holder of the deficiency 
claim receive the value at least equal to the allowed amount of such a claim ($30, in our 
example). Otherwise, the absolute priority rule prohibits the holder of any junior claim or 
interest (the owner-manager, in our example) from receiving or retaining, on account of such 
junior claim or interest, any property. Such requirement can be a heavy burden to the debtor (or 
the debtor’s owner-manager) pursuing confirmation. 132
Although cramdown may not be available in such circumstances as described above, it can 
still work as an exit option of the debtor against secured creditors in other situations. In one case, 
the face value of the claim of the secured creditor may not exceed the value of the collateral, so 
no deficiency claim may arise.133 In another case, the amount of the deficiency claim may be 
small and consist of only a minority of the class of unsecured creditors (assuming the deficiency 
claim is classified into the same class as other unsecured creditors). In such cases, the plan may
be accepted by the class of unsecured creditors, so no violation of the absolute priority rule may 
arise. Thus, the plan can be crammed down on the secured creditor if the requirements of 
section 1129(b)(2)(A), which generally requires to give the secured creditor the value of the 
131 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B). For the absolute priority rule, see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 122, ¶ 1129.04 [4]. 
132
 One additional complication remains. There has been a long-standing debate whether, in spite of 
the absolute priority rule, the equity holder (the owner-manager in our example) can retain the 
interest by providing the property whose value is equal to the value of the equity of the reorganized 
business (the “new value” exception). In Bank of America National v. 203 North LaSalle Street 
Partnership, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the confirmation of the plan which vested equity in the 
reorganization business to the equity holder “without extending an opportunity to anyone else either 
to compete for that equity or to propose a competing reorganization plan.” 526 U.S. 434, 454 (1999). 
It is not clear whether or to what extent this decision has denied the new value exception. Compare 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, ¶ 1129.04 [4][c][iv][E], at 1129-137(“[p]ractice in the 
wake of 203 North LaSalle has been uncertain... Lawyers for new value proponents will likely argue 
that simply terminating plan proposal exclusivity under section 1121 should be sufficient, in that this 
would expose the debtor to the market, and cause any interest to manifest itself in competing plans”) 
with Barry E. Adler & George G. Triantis, The Aftermath of North LaSalle Street, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1225 (2002) (proposing extended use of the market test suggested by the Supreme Court). 
133 See, e.g., In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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collateral, are satisfied.
B. Analysis of Relative Advantages of the Two Procedures
As was discussed in the last section, Chapter 11 and the Civil Rehabilitation Act have 
common aspects: they both give the debtor an “option” to retain a property necessary for her 
business notwithstanding the objection of the creditors who have security interests in it, 
basically by paying the value of such property. Still, there exists one important difference
between the two regimes. While the Civil Rehabilitation Act requires the debtor to make 
one-time payment of the collateral in order to extinguish security interests,134 Chapter 11 
allows the debtor to make deferred payments for cramdown.135 This section analyzes the 
relative advantages of these two rules.136
1. Difficulty of the Civil Rehabilitation Act: the Debtor’s Liquidity-Constraint
To talk about the potential problem of the Civil Rehabilitation Act first, its requirement of
one-time payment may make it too difficult for debtors to exercise their options because they 
are typically liquidity-constrained.137 Of course, a debtor in liquidity-constraint will try to 
obtain a loan, and in so doing, she can collateralize the very property the security interests in 
which she tries to extinguish. Still, it may be difficult for the debtor to borrow the amount of 
134 See section II.C.2, supra.
135 See supra note 126 and the accompanying text.
136
 Still another difference between the two procedures may exit; that is, the methods of evaluating 
the collateral appear different. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997)
(holding that, in a Chapter 13 cramdown case, the collateral should be valued at its replacement cost, 
not its foreclosure value). 
137
 Some practitioners in Japan have mentioned such difficulty. See, e. g., JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF 
BUSINESS RECOVERY, supra note 111, at 20 (“Since the debtor must prepare the cash which amounts 
to the value of the collateral, it seems practically difficult for the debtor to use [the procedure of 
extinguishing security interests], except for the case where there appear sponsors for the debtor”) 
(translated by the Author). Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried also view the debtor’s liquidity 
constraint as an important obstacle for the debtor to make a bargain with the secured creditors. See 
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 85, at 2424-25.
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money equal to 100% of the value of the property. The debtor may pledge other assets she owns
as collateral, but doing so is also difficult if most of her assts have already been encumbered.138
Theoretically speaking, as long as the going concern value of the collateral exceeds its 
liquidation value (G>L), it is possible for the debtor to promise a positive expected return to the 
creditor lending L and, at the same time, to promise all the existing creditors more returns than 
what they would receive if the debtor failed to obtain a loan and let the collateral be seized and 
sold at auction.139 In reality, however, it is likely that G is uncertain and the debtor has private 
information on it. Such information asymmetry, which makes bargaining between the debtor 
and the secured creditors costly,140 may also prevent the debtor from obtaining a loan. Overall, 
we cannot deny the possibility that the debtor fails to prepare the amount of cash enough to 
extinguish security interests. 
Cramdown in Chapter 11 may mitigate the problem of liquidity-constraint by allowing the 
debtor to make deferred payments of the value of the collateral. We must consider carefully, 
however, whether addressing the problem of liquidity-constraint by this way is truly a better 
policy.
2. Problems of Chapter 11: Difficulty of Evaluation by the Court
A difficulty of Chapter 11 is that it requires the court to determine much more complicated
138 Law of DIP (debtor-in-possession) financing can also affect the debtor’s ability to obtain a loan. 
A loan to the debtor in the Civil Rehabilitation proceeding becomes a “claim of common benefits 
(kyoeki saiken)” and enjoys priority over unsecured claims. See CRA §§119(v) & 120. Common 
benefits claims will receive a ranking after secured claims, however. See Anderson, supra note 32, at 
387-88. In contrast to the American law, see 11 U.S.C. §364(d), the Civil Rehabilitation Act has no 
procedure to authorize the debtor to issue debt secured by an equal or senior lien on already 
encumbered assets. Some commentators propose that Japanese reorganization law should also have 
such a procedure. See, e.g., Shinjiro Takagi, Kinmirai no tosan jittai ho [Bankruptcy Law in the Near 
Future], 745 NBL 9, 17 (2002). Making it easier for the debtor to obtain secured loans may be 
problematic, however, because the debtor may have distorted incentives to borrow and invest in a 
too risky  business at the costs of existing creditors. See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the 
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993).
139
 This is another application of Coase Theorem. See supra note 87.
140
 See section III.B.1, supra. 
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matters than the Civil Rehabilitation Act does. In the procedure of extinguishing security 
interests, the court only has to estimate the value of the collateral. In cramdown, on the other 
hand, the court has to estimate not only the value of the collateral but also the value of deferred 
payments. In order to do so, the court must first examine the reasonableness of the plan’s 
prospects of future revenues and costs, and determine whether the debtor is likely to earn 
enough amounts of cash to make such payments as promised in the plan (determination of the 
plan’s “feasibility”).141 Some courts make relatively strict reviews on these matters,142 while 
others easily accept the prospects offered by debtors.143 Anyway, such reviews are clearly 
difficult and subject to quite a few errors.
After examining feasibility of the plan, the court must further determine proper interest rates
(“cramdown rates”) by which to discount the deferred payments in order to estimate the present 
value of those payments.144 Speaking in an abstract way, the court should determine the rate 
which a creditor “would charge, at the time of the effective date of the plans, for a loan of 
similar character, amount and duration.”145 But to say so is much easier than to do so in practice. 
141 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(11) (confirmation of the plan must be denied if it is not feasible; that is, 
if it is likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need of further reorganization). 
142 See, e.g., In re Edgewater Motel, Inc., 85 B.R. 989 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Landmark at 
Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 B.R. 653 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1980)
143 See, e.g., In re Orfa Corp., 129 B.R. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Guilford Telecasters, Inc., 
128 B.R. 622 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1991); In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664 (Bankr. D. N.H. 
1991)
144 As for legal issues concerning the cramdown rates, see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
122, ¶ 1129.06[1][c]; David G. Epstein, Don't Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down 
Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 435 (1998); Hon. John K. Pearson et al., Ending the Judicial Snipe 
Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown Interest Rate, 4 AM. BANKRT. INST. L. REV. 35 (1996).
145 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 70 (3d Cir. 1993). This approach in 
determining cramdown rates is called the “forced-loan” approach, and has been accepted by the 
majority of Circuit Courts. See the literatures cited in note 144. In a recent Chapter 13 cramdown 
case, however, the Supreme Court of the United States explicitly rejected the forced-loan approach 
and instead accepted the “formula” approach, which employs the national prime rate as a base rate 
and adjusts it to account for the greater nonpayment risk that bankrupt debtors pose. See Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477-80 (2004). Nevertheless, this decision appears significantly 
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The court might be able to refer to the current rates in a market of a similar loan if such a market 
really exists. In fact, courts often state that no market exists for a loan to reorganizing firms like 
the debtor with such terms as provided in the plan.146 In one sense, it is no wonder that courts 
cannot find such a market; for, if the debtor were able to obtain a loan in such a market, she 
would simply obtain it and make one-time payment to the secured creditor objecting the plan. 
So no disputes concerning the value of deferred payments would arise. The fact that the debtor 
tries to force the term of deferred payments on the objecting secured creditor strongly implies
that she cannot obtain a similar loan in the market. 
Anyway, courts do not reject confirmation of the plan simply because they do not find 
proper market rates. Instead, they refer to publicly available interest rates, such as prime rates or 
rates of the U.S. Treasury Bills, to which they add some risk premium, usually 1 - 3%, and 
manage to construct cramdown rates.147 Courts rarely fully analyze, however, how they find a 
particular risk premium to be appropriate for a particular debtor’s business.148 Determining an 
influenced by the belief of the plurality of the Court that subprime auto-loan markets are neither 
competitive nor efficient, see id. at 481-83, so it is questionable whether the decision will be applied 
to a typical business reorganization case under Chapter 11, in which we can assume that relatively 
competitive loan markets exist. See Daniel J. Carragher, What the Supreme Court’s Prime Plus 
Ruling Means for Chapter11, 23-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (July/Aug. 2004); Ronald F. Greenspan 
& Cynthia Nelson, “UnTill” We Meet Again: Why the Till Decision Might Not Be the Last Word on 
Cramdown Interest Rates, 23-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 48 (Dec. 2004/ Jan. 2005). I do not have to 
specifically examine this debate, anyway. Suffice it to say that determining a proper interest rate in 
cramdown context is so controversial that courts do not agree even on the basic policy on how to 
determine it. 
146
 See, e.g., In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664, 672 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) ; In re Aztec, 
107 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
147 See, e.g., In re Guilford Telecasters, Inc., 128 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1991); In re
Crane Auto., Inc., 88 B.R. 81, 85 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 1989). 
148 See Friedman, supra note 123, at 1519-20 (“courts rarely fully analyze the proper components of 
the market rate, whether the components should be the costs of funds, administrative costs, profit, 
risk, or others”).
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appropriate cramdown rate by the court is a highly uncertain estimation, if not an utter 
guesswork.
    By relying on cramdown, the debtor may be able to retain the collateral, and perhaps also 
retain her own business, even when she can obtain neither consents of secured creditors nor a 
loan in the market. In this sense, cramdown is characterized as a way for the court to save the 
debtor’s business which has not passed the “test” of the market. Whether such an intervention of 
the court is socially beneficial needs a serious consideration. Certainly, markets may not 
function well in providing finance to reorganizing firms, especially when there is asymmetric 
information on the firm’s value. But if the firm’s value is not observable by the market players, 
it is difficult for the court to observe it, too. And if, on reverse, the court can (at least partially) 
observe the information on the firm’s value, then it is hard to see why the market players cannot 
observe it. Because evaluating assets and businesses is one of typical business decisions, it is 
likely that market players have more incentives and ability in it than the courts.149 Thus, when 
the debtor cannot persuade market players to finance the value of the collateral, it is dubious 
whether the intervention of the court will improve efficiency. Such intervention may well help 
inefficient businesses to survive, either by recognizing feasibility too easily or by setting 
cramdown rates too low. It may also encourage many debtors, whose businesses are not worth 
continuing, to petition for reorganization and impose costs of delay on creditors.150 The large 
number of petitions151 and low success rates of reorganization152 of Chapter 11, compared with 
149 See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90, at 93.
150
 Chapter 11 has long been criticized as imposing costly delay on creditors. See, e.g., Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control – System Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?,
57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (First Installment), 247 (Second Installment) (1983) (cases of small 
businesses); Lawrence A. Weiss, The Bankruptcy Code and Violations of Absolute Priority, 4 J. APPL. 
CORP. FIN. 71 (1991) (cases of publicly held corporations). 
151 See supra note 45 for recent number of filings. 
152 See supra note 50 for confirmation rates and supra note 59 for consummation rates.
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those of the Civil Rehabilitation Act,153 suggest that the problems of Chapter 11 described 
above are really serious. 
    Considering difficulty created by permitting the debtor to make deferred payments, a good 
policy reason seems to exist for the Civil Rehabilitation Act to insist on one-time payment to 
extinguish security interests, even though such requirement may sometimes cause inefficient 
foreclosure sales, and therefore inefficient liquidation of the debtors’ businesses, because of the 
debtors’ liquidity constraint.154
153 See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying texts for comparison of the performances of Chapter 
11 with that of the Civil Rehabilitation Act. 
154
  Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried proposed a novel auction regime which would, they argue, 
solve problems of both liquidity-constraint and evaluation of the collateral simultaneously. See 
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 85. In contrast to ordinary foreclosure, what is sold at auction in their 
proposal is not collateral but a nonrecourse note with a face amount equal to the secured creditor’s 
claim, backed by the asset serving as the creditor’s collateral. Their auction scheme consists of three 
stages. In the first stage, which takes place shortly before the end of the bankruptcy proceeding, the 
nonrecourse note is sold at auction, and the proceeds from the auction will be used to pay off the 
corresponding secured claim. If the proceed is less than satisfy the full amount of the creditor’s 
claim, the remainder of his claim becomes an unsecured claim. The second stage is completion of 
the bankruptcy proceeding, where the bankruptcy pie is divided and distributed to unsecured 
creditors and equity-holders. Such distribution can take place either in the present bankruptcy regime
(i.e., in Chapter 11) or in recently proposed market-based mechanisms, such as an auction or option 
scheme. For market-based mechanisms, see section VI.A, infra. In the third and final stage, the 
debtor who has emerged from reorganization negotiates with the holders of the nonrecourse notes, 
who bought such notes at auction in the first stage, in order to resolve the notes. In the opinion of 
Bebchuk and Fried, the only obstacle for the debtor to reach an efficient agreement with the secured 
creditors is liquidity-constraint of the debtor. See id., at 2396. Since the debtor has undergone 
reorganization, Bebchuk and Fried argue, the debtor should generally be solvent. See id. at 2423. 
Thus, the debtor and the noteholders will reach an efficient agreement in the third stage; that is, the 
debtor will retain the collateral if and only if she values it the most (or, in the terminology of this 
Article, if and only if G > L). Otherwise the collateral will be seized and bought at auction by a 
person who values it the most. 
   Several considerations put it into doubt whether their proposal would work well in practice, 
however. First, if liquidity-constraint is such a serious problem as Bebchuk and Fried are concerned, 
it is suspicious whether this problem will be solved even in the third stage. In particular, small firms 
often depend on secured loans from banks for their financial need. See id. at 2389 n.1 (introducing 
the survey which shows almost 80% of total volume of small business loans was secured). Such 
debtors may well still owe significant amount of (secured) debts and suffer liquidity-constraint even 
after they resolve their unsecured debts in reorganization. 
Second, although Bebchuk and Fried consider the debtor’s liquidity-constraint as the only 
obstacle in the negotiation between the debtor and the secured creditors, other factors, such as 
information asymmetry over the going concern value of the collateral or the hold-up of multiple 
secured creditors asking for larger share of the going concern surplus, may also prevent the parties
from bargaining smoothly, as was discussed in section III.B.1, supra. These problems will remain 
even in the third stage, and make it difficult for the debtor and the secured creditors to reach an 
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V. Ex Ante Effects of Extinguishing Security Interests
So far I have analyzed social benefits of the procedure of extinguishing security interests 
from a perspective of allocation efficiency at the time of reorganization, that is, how this 
procedure can work in allocating an encumbered asset to more efficient use with less transaction 
costs. The procedure of extinguishing security interests may also affect investment efficiency,
however; that is, a debtor’s incentive to invest before reorganization may also be changed. We 
cannot appreciate net social benefits of this procedure unless we examine the latter effect. 
Since the procedure of extinguishing security interests gives a debtor an option to recapture 
the collateral just by paying its liquidation value, it tends to reduce the return of secured credit
in bankruptcy. In particular, consider a case where the going concern value of the collateral 
exceeds its liquidation value (G > L). If the procedure of extinguishing security interests did not 
efficient agreement. 
 The third difficulty of their proposal concerns the second stage, especially if the distribution of 
the bankruptcy pie takes place in the present Chapter 11 proceeding. In such a scheme, a plan is 
presented to unsecured creditors and equity-holders for their approval or rejection. But holders of 
nonrecourse secured notes do not participate in this resolution; they are supposed to negotiate with 
the debtor after the bankruptcy resolution. Thus, unsecured creditors and equity-holders have to 
decide whether or not to approve the plan with no idea whether, after the resolution, holders of 
secured notes will also reach an accommodation with the debtor. This puts unsecured creditors and 
equity-holders into a very uncertain position. For example, if unsecured creditors approve the plan to 
cut their claims, but later (in the third stage) holders of secured notes foreclose on the assets, forcing 
the debtor’s business to liquidate, then the return of unsecured creditors in liquidation will decrease 
because of their concession that turns out to be a meaningless sacrifice. Such an uncertainty makes it 
hard for unsecured creditors and equity-holders to judge the merits of the plan. Also, courts may well 
find it difficult to evaluate the plan’s feasibility, which is necessary for confirmation of the plan. See 
11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(11). 
   Under the Civil Rehabilitation Act, secured creditors are legally “separated” from the Civil 
Rehabilitation proceeding. See supra note 60 and the accompanying text. Since successful 
reorganization often turns on accommodation of secured creditors, however, courts usually 
recommend debtors to make concessions (so called “security agreements,” see supra note 111 and 
the accompanying text) with the secured creditors before the plans are presented for approval of the 
unsecured creditors. See comment by Koji Mori, Judge of Osaka District Court, in: Yoichiro 
Komatsu et.al., Zadankai: Saikin no Osaka Chisai no tosan jitsumu nit suite [Panel Discussion: On 
Recent Bankruptcy Practices in the Osaka District Court], 605 GINKO HOMU-21 6, 17-18 (2002). 
Under Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal, in contrast, the debtor has not even begun negotiation with the 
secured creditors by the time the plan is presented to unsecured creditors for resolution. Such a 
scheme will make it hard for the plan to obtain consent of unsecured creditors, so even a debtor who 
has a strong prospect of reorganization may be forced into liquidation. 
Extinguishing Security Interests 50
50
exist and the secured creditor were able to enforce his lien, then the debtor would have to 
bargain with the secured creditor in order to obtain his consent to stop foreclose. In 
compensation for his consent, the secured creditor could obtain L at minimum (if not, he would 
quit the negotiation and foreclose), and also some share of the going concern surplus (G – L).155
In contrast, when the procedure of extinguishing security interests does exit, the secured creditor 
only receives L and has his security interest extinguished. Such reduction of the return of 
secured credit is, by itself, only a matter of transfer of income; to the extent the return of the 
secured creditor decreases, the joint returns of the unsecured creditors and the debtor’s 
equity- holders will increase. As has already been discussed in literatures, however, the priority 
of secured credit is likely to create some social benefits.156 Thus, to the extent of curtailing such 
priority, the procedure of extinguishing security interests may diminish net social benefits.
Instead of making a complete list of social benefits of secured credit that might be affected by 
this procedure,157 this Part focuses on one social benefit which seems most relevant in this 
context: preventing over-borrowing/ over-investment by the debtor. Section A illustrates how the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests may diminish the benefit of secured credit and 
distort the debtor’s incentive to borrow and make an investment. Section B discusses on the 
trade-off between the allocation (ex post) efficiency and investment (ex ante) efficiency. 
155 See supra note 86 and the accompanying text. 
156 See e.g., Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and 
Priorities among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in 
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Mann, supra note 92; Ronald J. Mann, 
The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J 1 (1997); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. 
& Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J.FIN. 
247 (1979); Rene M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501 
(1985); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225 (1992); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND.
L. REV. 473 (1984). But see Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review 
of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) (arguing that social benefits of secured credit are 
not clear); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of the Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (suggesting that full priority of secured clams may 
cause excessive use of secured credit). 
157
 For a variety of possible social benefits of security interests, see the literatures cited in note 156.
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A. Ex Ante Effect of Extinguishing Security Interests: Problems of Debtors’ 
Over-borrowing and Over-Investment
1. Problems of Debtors’ Over-borrowing and Over-investment and How Secured 
Loan Can Mitigate Them
   Once a debtor borrows money, the interests of the debtor sometimes diverge from those of 
creditors. Such diversion of interests creates a variety of agency problems.158 One of these 
problems recognized by preceding literatures is that the debtor may have an incentive to newly 
borrow and invest in an overly risky (and inefficient) business at the expense of existing
creditors.159
Let me explain this point by a simple example (see Figure 1 below). Suppose now (at t = 1) 
the debtor owns a property, X, which is worth $100. For now, I assume both the going concern 
value and the liquidation value of X are $100. (This assumption will be changed later). The 
debtor owes $100 to one creditor, C1, and does not have any other assets or debts. If the debtor 
just keeps operating her business and sees the maturity date of C1’s claim to come (at t = 2), C1 
will collect his entire claim from the value of X and the debtor will receive nothing. Suppose, 
however, that the debtor has an opportunity to invest in expanding her business at t = 1. This 
investment costs $200, and its chance of success or failure is 50-50. The debtor’s business will 
earn $210 in case of success, and $170 in case of failure, at t = 2. The value of X will remain 
$100 in either case. For simplicity, I assume that all the parties are risk-neutral and do not have 
time preferences ($1 at t = 1 has a value equal to $1 at t = 2). I also assume that the finance 
market is competitive. These assumptions mean that the debtor can borrow $200 at t = 1 if and 
only if she can promise a new lender (say, C2) an expected gross return of $200.
158 See, e.g., Triantis, supra note 156, at 234-38, for a list of agency problems. 
159 See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J.FIN. ECON. 147 (1977). 
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[INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
In this example, the net present value of the investment is negative ($.5×220 + .5×170 –
200 = -$5), so the debtor should not borrow and invest. The debtor has an incentive to do so, 
however, if C1’s claim is unsecured. In this case, the debtor can borrow $200 at t = 1 from C2
with an interest rate r = .0778. This interest rate makes sure that C2 will earn the expected gross
return of $200 and the debtor will earn a positive profit. To see this, suppose the debtor borrows 
from C2 at this rate and invests. If the debtor’s business succeeds at t = 2, its total value will be 
$320 ($220 plus the value of X, $100). The debtor will pay $100 to C1 and $200 × (1 + .0778) = 
$215.56 to C2, and retain $4.44 for her own. If, on the other hand, the debtor’s business fails at t 
=2, then the debtor will be insolvent (the value of the debtor’s entire business will be $100 + 
170 = $270, which is less than the total amount of debts, $100 + 215.56 = $315.56), and the two 
creditors will divide the value of the debtor’s business pro rata in proportion to the face values 
of their claims. Thus, C1 will receive $270×100/(100+215.56) = $85.56, and C2 will receive 
$270×215.56/(100+215.56) = $184.44. Consequently, C2’s expected (gross) return of lending is 
$.5×215.56 +$ .5×184.44 = $200, so the debtor can borrow $200 from C2 at t = 1. Since the 
debtor expects a positive profit (she will obtain $4.44 in case of success and $0 in case of 
failure), she has an incentive to borrow and invest at the expense of C1 (see Table 2).160
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Preceding literatures have already mentioned that such an over-borrowing/ over-investment 
problem can be mitigated by making the original debt secured.161 In the above example, 
suppose C1’s claim has already been secured by X at t =1. Then C2 can no longer expect to 
160
 In fact, C1 gets hurt even when the investment at t = 1 is efficient (for instance, when the 
probability of success is 80%), as long as the new borrowing and investment subjects C1’s claim to 
the risk of default. But if this is the only problem, C1 can be compensated in advance by requiring a 
higher interest rate at the time of lending. There is no merit to make C1’s claim secured and 
discourage the debtor from newly borrowing and investing in an efficient business.
161 See Mann, supra note 92, at 641-43; Mann, supra note 156, at 25-26; Triantis, supra note 156, at 
248.
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collect his claim from the value of X, and must rely solely on the return from the new 
investment. But the expected return of this investment is only $195, so the debtor cannot borrow 
from C2 and invest.162
2. How Extinguishing Security Interests May Diminish Benefit of Secured Credit
Problems may arise, however, when assets subject to security interests have low liquidation 
values. Some types of assets tend to have very low liquidation values compared with their going 
concern values. For example, machinery sometimes has only a thin secondary market, so its 
liquidation value decreases drastically once it has been equipped.163 Inventory is also sold at a 
very low price when it is sold in liquidation.164
Now change the assumption in the above example and suppose that the liquidation value of 
X is $0 while its going concern value is $100. Even in this case, C1’s security interest in X may 
have some value if the procedure of extinguishing security interests does not exist. This is 
because, without this procedure, the debtor must bargain with C1 to redeem X when she is in 
default at t = 2, and through such bargaining, C1 may be able to enjoy some share of the going 
concern value of X. If C1’s bargaining power at t = 2 is expected to be sufficiently strong, the 
debtor’s borrowing and investment at t = 1 may be prevented. In particular, suppose that both 
162
 Instead of using secured credit, the debtor’s over-borrowing (and over-investment) may also be 
prevented by including covenants in the loan contract between the debtor and C1. For instance, the 
covenant can require the debtor to obtain consent of C1 before borrowing. Such covenants, however, 
may not be effective because of their enforcement costs. Unlike security interests, covenants do not 
have an effect to make C1’s claim superior to C2’s claim when the debtor borrows from C2 in 
violation of the covenants. Thus, C1 has to monitor the debtor to see whether the debtor secretly 
borrows at t = 1. Because monitoring is costly, C1 may not be able to prevent the debtor from 
borrowing and investing. See Mann, supra note 92, at 643. 
163 See Shinjiro Takagi, Saimu chosei tetsuzuki (kasho) ni okeru tanpoken shometsu seikyu no ranyo 
boshi saku [Proposals to Prevent Abuses of Extinguishing Security Interests in the New Debt 
Arrangement Proceeding (Temporary Name)], 563 GINKO HOMU-21 35, 39 (1999).
164 See CHIKAHIKO SODA, KAISHA KOSEI TETSUZUKI NO SHIN TENKAI: KYU NIHON RIISU SAIKEI NO 
HORI TO JISSAI [NEW DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS: LAW AND 
PRACTICES IN REORGANIZATION OF FORMER NIHON LEASE, CORP.] 181 (2000). Inventory and 
equipment are often sold at very low prices in foreclosures sales in the United States, too. See Mann, 
supra note 156, at 15-16. 
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the debtor and C2 expect, at t =1, that if the debtor is in default at t = 2 and has to bargain with 
C1 to redeem X, she will have to pay more than $90 to C1. In this case, if C2 lends the debtor 
$200 at t = 1, he can receive less than $180 when the debtor’s business fails.165 Thus, to assure 
C2 the expected return of $200, the debtor has to promise C2 to pay more than $220 when the 
business succeeds. But if so, the debtor will be insolvent even when the business succeeds at t =
2,166 so she cannot expect a positive return from the investment at t = 1. Consequently, the 
debtor has no incentive to borrow and invest at t = 1. 
The above result will be changed if there exists the procedure of extinguishing security 
interests. In this case, when the debtor’s business fails at t = 2, the debtor can extinguish C1’s 
interest just by paying the liquidation value of X, that is, $0. And C1 will make a claim of $100 
as an unsecured creditor. This result is exactly the same as the case where C1’s claim is not 
secured in the first place. Consequently, as was mentioned above (see Table 2, above), the 
debtor can borrow $200 from C2 at an interest rate r = .0778 and invest in the inefficient 
expansion of her business. 
In sum, this example illustrates that curtailing the priority of secured claims by the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests may have an undesirable ex ante effects, in that the 
debtor may have an incentive to borrow and invest in an overly risky (and inefficient) business 
at the expense of existing secured creditors. Furthermore, such a problem of 
over-borrowing/over-investment by the debtor may create the problem of 
under-borrowing/under-investment in a still earlier period of time. Let me explain this point by 
the above example. Suppose the debtor tries to borrow from C1 and invest in X at t = 0.167 If 
165
 In case of failure, the debtor’s business will earn $170. In addition to this return, the debtor will 
redeem X worth $100 by paying C1 higher than $90. Thus, the value of the debtor’s business will 
not exceed $180.
166
 The value of the debtor’s business in case of success will be $320, and she owes $100 to C1. 
Thus, if the debtor promises C2 to pay more than $220, she will be insolvent at t =2.  
167
 For simplicity, I assume there is no uncertainty at t = 0 on the value of X at the time of t = 2. At t 
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there does not exit the procedure of extinguishing security interests and the debtor’s borrowing 
and investment at t = 1 can be prevented by securing C1’s claim, then the debtor can promise 
C1 to pay $100 at t = 2. Thus, the debtor can borrow from C1 and invest as long as the 
investment cost in X at t = 0 does not exceed $100. This result is efficient because the debtor 
makes an investment if and only if its net present value is positive. In contrast, if there exits the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests, the debtor is expected to borrow and invest at t = 1, 
and so the expected return of C1 is only $92.78 (see Table 2, above). Thus the debtor can 
borrow and invest in X at t = 0 only if the investment cost in X does not exceed $92.78, creating 
an under-investment problem.
B. Trade-off between Allocation Efficiency and Investment Efficiency
I have argued that the procedure of extinguishing security interests may distort the debtor’s 
incentive to borrow and invest ex ante. On the other hand, this procedure may have benefits in 
allocating assets to more efficient uses with less transaction costs at the time of the debtor’s 
reorganization, as was explained in Part III.C, above. Accordingly, in evaluating social benefits 
of this procedure, we face the trade-off between the allocation (ex post) efficiency and the 
investment (ex ante) efficiency. Which factor is more likely to dominate is an empirical question, 
and the answer to this question is likely to depend on a particular nature of each debtor firm. 
For example, suppose the debtor is a small start-up business and has no assets other than 
those which will be sold at very low prices in liquidation (such as machinery and inventory). In 
this case, permitting the debtor to extinguish security interests by the payment of only the 
liquidation value of each encumbered asset would be almost equal to denying any priority of 
secured credit. The debtor’s incentive of over-borrowing and over-investment could not be 
= 0, both the debtor and C1 know that, if the debtor invests in X, its value will be $100 at t = 2 for 
certain.   
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prevented by secured loans, and consequently, the debtor might not be able to obtain the secured
credit and start up the business in the first place. The procedure of extinguish security interests 
may well be detrimental, rather than beneficial, for such a debtor.
Next, suppose the debtor is a matured firm and has a considerable amount of assets (such 
as real estate) which can be disposed of at relatively high prices. In this case, extinguishing 
security interests would not so much reduce the expected return of secured credit. On the other 
hand, since the reorganization of such a matured firm often involves multiple secured creditors, 
the transaction costs involved in the negotiation between the debtor and the secured creditors at 
the stage of reorganization could be high. In such a case, giving the debtor an option to exit out 
of the negotiation by paying the liquidation value of the collateral could considerably improve
the allocation efficiency with little countervailing effect on the investment efficiency.
VI. Policy Implications to the U.S. Law
   Although recent evidences suggest some changes may take place,168 Chapter 11 has long 
been criticized as imposing costly delays on creditors without many prospects of successful 
reorganization.169 Consequently, some law and economic scholars have proposed drastic 
changes to the present law.170 In concluding the analysis of this Article, I compare these 
proposals with the regime of the Civil Rehabilitation Act (in section A), and discuss some policy 
implications to the U.S. bankruptcy law (in section B).
168 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in 
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003).
169 See the literatures cited in note 150, supra. 
170
 For introduction of those proposals, see Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90. Of course, efforts to 
improve the present system have also been taken. See, e.g., NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW 
COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY – THE NEXT TEN YEARS (1997). 
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A. Civil Rehabilitation Act Compared with Recent Proposals to Reform Chapter 11 
1. Alternative Bankruptcy Regimes Proposed by the Scholarship
Since the late 1980s, many commentators have advocated the replacement of Chapter 11 
with some creative alternatives. Some scholars suggest that the entire assets of the bankrupt firm 
should be sold in an auction.171 Others advocate the procedure of “equity cancellation,” where 
all the interests of existing shareholders of the firm are automatically eliminated and new shares 
are issued to its creditors.172 Still others propose an “option” approach.173 According to their 
proposal, new stocks of the bankrupt firm are distributed to its senior creditors in lieu of their 
claims, and members of each lower class are given, in lieu of their claims or interests, options to 
purchase a pro rata share of such stocks by paying their pro rata portion of the senior claims. 
After the exercise period of the options has expired, the firm will have only stocks and no debts. 
The common feature of these proposals is to abolish the present Chapter 11 regime, which 
attempts to help a bankrupt firm to be reorganized through the negotiation among the firms’ 
existing stakeholders (secured and unsecured creditors and equity-holders), and to establish 
some completely new regimes, which let the residual claimants of each firm determine the
destiny of their firm. In the auction approach, acquirers would determine the destiny of acquired 
firms, whether to reorganize or to liquidate. In the equity cancellation and option approach, new 
shareholders would make such a decision. These proposed systems, if ideally work, would
eliminate the need of costly negotiation altogether and save a lot of transaction costs. However, 
the mechanism to transfer the control of the bankrupt firm to its residual claimants would also 
171 See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.LEG. STUD.127 
(1986).
172 See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter 11, 101 YALE. L.J. 1043 (1992).
173 See Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523 
(1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
775 (1988).
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involve costs. As for the auction approach for instance, the costs necessary for potential bidders 
to raise funds and gather information about the bankrupt firms being acquired could be 
substantial.174 It is not necessarily clear whether the costs involved in the proposed regimes
would be less than the costs involved in the traditional, negotiation-based reorganization
regimes such as Chapter 11. Considering this unclearness, recent trend of the scholarship seems 
to endorse the “menu” approach. 175 Under the menu approach, Congress would enact 
alternative bankruptcy systems, including the current procedure and the newly proposed 
procedures described above. Firms would be required to select, at the time of incorporation,
which bankruptcy regime would apply if they later encounter financial distress.176
2. Evaluation of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, Compared with Proposed 
Mechanisms
Compared with those proposals (aside from the menu approach), the Civil Rehabilitation 
Act looks more like Chapter 11 in that it basically attempts to help the firms be reorganized
through the negotiation among the firms’ stakeholders. The Civil Rehabilitation Act differs 
from Chapter 11, however, in that it gives both the secured creditors and the debtor exit options.
By giving the secured creditor an option to enforce his right, -- perhaps after some limited 
period of temporary stay177 –  the Civil Rehabilitation Act attempts to prevent the debtor from 
prolonging the bankruptcy procedure at the costs of the creditors without many prospects of 
successful reorganization. At the same time, by giving the debtor an option to extinguish 
174
 For assessment of the costs of the auction regime and other proposals, see MARK J. ROE,
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY: LEGAL AND FINANCIAL MATERIALS 600-06 
(2000); Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90, at 106-10; David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the 
Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 465, 477-91.
175 See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992). Rasmussen further elaborated his proposal in his article coauthored with 
David Skeel. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90, at 110-15.
176 See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90, at 111.
177
 For temporary stay, see section II.C1, supra. 
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security interests by paying the liquidation value of the collateral, the Act also attempts to 
prevent the negotiation from delaying because of the hold-up of each secured creditor 
demanding larger share of the going concern surplus. To the extent that the court must estimate 
the liquidation value of the collateral when the parties do not agree on it, this approach premises 
on the intervention of the court. This type of intervention may not be very costly, however, 
because estimating the liquidation value of an individual asset is arguably not very difficult, at 
least compared with estimating the going concern value of a financially distressed firm. In this 
respect, the Civil Rehabilitation Act may be relieved from the criticism often brought against 
Chapter 11 – that the courts are not well- equipped for evaluation of businesses.178
Of course, the solution of the Civil Rehabilitation Act does not necessarily lead to an 
efficient result. First, if the court cannot estimate the liquidation value of the collateral in an 
accurate and foreseeable way, then the procedure of extinguishing security interests may 
function poorly in reducing transaction costs in reorganization.179 In addition, even if this
procedure improves the allocation efficiency at the time of reorganization, it may involve ex 
ante social costs in that, by restricting the priority of secured claims, it may induce a debtor to 
over-borrow and over-invest at the expense of the existing creditors.180
Considering these difficulties, we can hardly say that the regime of the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act always involves less cost than the Chapter 11 regime or the recently 
proposed regimes described above. Still, it is worthwhile to note that some 1,000 firms each 
year, involving dozens of publicly held corporations,181 apply for the Civil Rehabilitation 
proceedings,182 and a considerable percentage of these firms succeed in reorganization with 
178 See, e.g., Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90, at 93.
179 See supra note 104 and the accompanying text.
180 See section V.A.
181 See supra note 48 and the accompanying text. 
182
 See supra note 43 and the accompanying text. 
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relatively short periods.183 This evidence suggests that a relatively simple system of the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act, which combines the negotiation among the stakeholders with a mild
intervention of the court, can work fairly effectively in many cases. It also suggests that, at least 
for some firms, the reorganization system may be considerably improved without completely 
replacing the traditional negotiation-based regime with the proposed regimes which would 
dispense with the negotiation among the stakeholders altogether.
B. Some Policy Implications
Based on the above discussion, what can we say as a policy implication to the U.S. 
reorganization law? First of all, I strongly agree with the advocates of the menu approach on the 
point that different firms may well find different bankruptcy regimes appropriate for them.184
Taking the procedure of extinguishing security interests for instance, desirability of allowing 
debtors to extinguish security interests by paying the liquidation value of each encumbered asset
may well depend on the characteristics of the debtor firms, as was discussed in section V.B, 
above. Similar consideration can apply to any other bankruptcy systems; the auction approach 
may be appropriate for some firms, while retaining the Chapter 11 regime may be preferable for 
others. This consideration leads me to support the menu approach. Instead of imposing a single 
bankruptcy system on all firms, Congress should prepare alternative regimes and require each 
firm to select a regime at the time of incorporation. Because firms which choose inefficient
procedures will be penalized by higher interest rates required by their creditors, we can expect 
that firms have good incentives to choose bankruptcy systems which are the most appropriate 
for them.185
183 See supra notes 49-59 and the accompanying text. 
184 See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 90, at 110-11. 
185
 A main difficulty of the menu approach is that, after selecting one regime and obtaining loans, a 
debtor firm has an incentive opportunistically to amend its selection to the one that is preferable for 
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Assuming the menu approach is employed, the recently proposed regimes – the equity 
cancellation, auction and option approaches – would be natural candidates of the “menus”
which Congress should prepare as alternatives to the present Chapter 11 regime. I would argue, 
however, that Congress should also consider adopting (1) a regime similar to the Composition 
Act186 and (2) a regime similar to the Civil Rehabilitation Act, as two additional alternatives. In 
the first regime, the secured creditors could freely enforce their rights.187 This option of the 
secured creditors to exit out of the reorganization procedure would help to prevent the debtor 
from prolonging the procedure with little hope of reorganization. The negotiation between the 
debtor and the secured creditors with only the latter having an exit option, however, might 
become costly as was discussed in section III.B, above. In case of this, Congress should also 
allow the debtor firms to choose a regime similar to the Civil Rehabilitation Act, in which both 
the debtor and the secured creditors have exit options. 
I argue that both regimes should be adopted as alternative menus; for, as was discussed in
Part V, giving the debtor an option to extinguish security interests by paying the liquidation 
value of the collateral is not always desirable. In particular, if the debtor has only assets with 
very low liquidation values, such an option may seriously distort the debtor’s incentive to invest, 
and in turn, the debtor may not even obtain secured loans in the first place. In this case, a 
desirable regime may be the one which gives only the secured creditor an exit option. On the 
its shareholders and managers. Still, such difficulty can be overcome by imposing proper 
requirement for the mid-stream amendment of the debtor’s choice. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra
note 90, at 111 (requiring the debtor to announce the amendment one year before such amendment,
in addition to allowing each creditor to contract with the debtor in advance to prevent the mid-stream 
amendment). 
186
 As was explained in section II.A.2, supra, the Composition Act had been a general 
reorganization law in Japan until its abolishment by the Civil Rehabilitation Act. The Composition 
Act had no restriction on secured claims. 
187
 This Article is not the first one to suggest a regime where secured creditors are not subject to the 
automatic stay. Such a regime has already been suggested in Baird & Picker, supra note87, at 349 
(“The automatic stay of the secured creditor is neither an uncontroversial nor immutable feature of 
bankruptcy law”), and explicitly advocated as one “menu” available to all firms in Rasmussen & 
Skeel, supra note 90, at 111 (in the name of “selective stay”). 
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other hand, some debtor firms may have enough assets with relatively high liquidation values 
and obtain secured debts from multiple lenders. For such firms, the regime giving both parties 
exit options may be desirable. 
Conclusion
This Article analyzed how secured creditors are treated in Japanese reorganization law. 
Although the Civil Rehabilitation Act neither imposes automatic stay on secured claims nor 
permits modification of secured claims by a rehabilitation plan, it has a unique procedure to 
restrict the rights of secured creditors: the procedure of extinguishing security interests. In 
essence, this procedure permits a debtor to cancel security interests in any property she owns 
which is necessary for continuation of the debtor’s business, by paying the secured creditors 
only the liquidation value of the property. I analyze how this procedure can work as an “exit 
option” of the debtor and reduce the transaction costs which would arise if the debtor had to 
bargain with the secured creditors to avoid foreclosure. 
I also compared the procedure of extinguishing security interests with cramdown in 
Chapter 11, and discuss relative advantages of these two rules. Although both procedures can be 
viewed as exit options of the debtor negotiating with the secured creditors, there exists 
important difference: While extinguishing security interests requires the debtor to make 
one-time payment, cramdown permits the debtor to make deferred cash payments. Each 
procedure has its own merit and demerit. While requirement of one time-payment may restrict 
the debtor’s ability to use the procedure of extinguishing security interests because of 
liquidity-constraint, permitting the debtor to make deferred payments imposes the court a heavy 
burden of evaluating financially distressed firms. Considering that the court is not an expert of 
evaluation of businesses, a good policy reason seems to exist demanding the debtor to make 
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one-time payment, and letting the market decide whether to finance the debtor. . 
Although I maintain that there exists a good policy in permitting the debtor to extinguish 
security interests for the purpose of efficient reorganization, it also involves costs. By curtailing
the priority of secured claims, the procedure of extinguishing security interests may produce 
social costs ex ante. In particular, I argued that this procedure may induce the debtor to 
over-borrow and make an investment in too risky businesses at the expense of existing creditors. 
After examining costs and benefits of the procedure of extinguishing security interests, the 
last Part of the Article discussed on some policy implication of the U.S. law. Based on the 
“menu” approach recently proposed by scholars, I argued that Congress should consider 
preparing a regime similar to the Civil Rehabilitation Act as one of the menus, from which firms 
can choose as a bankruptcy system applicable to them at the time of financial distress.
I hope this Article will enhance our understanding on how the law should treat secured 
creditors in a reorganization procedure, and will contribute to the improvement of our 
bankruptcy systems.
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Table 1. Overview of Japanese Reorganization Laws
Corporate Reorganization Act
(1952-present)*
Composition Act
(1922-2000)**
Civil Rehabilitation Act
(2000-present)
Basic characteristics Special procedure for stock 
corporations
General procedure for all types of 
businesses
General procedure for all types of 
businesses
Who manage firms during the 
proceedings?
Court-appointed trustees Present management Present management,
except for special circumstances 
(e.g.,, mismanagement)
What types of claims/interests
are subject to proceedings?
All types of claims/interests Unsecured claims Unsecured claims, in principle
(but see below)
Any restriction on secured claims? Yes (Automatic stay, bifurcation, 
& modification by the 
reorganization  plan)
No (Secured creditors can freely 
enforce their interests)
Some (Basically, secured creditors 
can enforce their rights. But their 
rights are subject to temporary stay 
& extinguishing security interests)
             *The Corporate Reorganization Act was thoroughly revised in 2002, but its basic structure remains the same.
                              **The Composition Act was replaced by the Civil Rehabilitation Act in April, 2000.
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Table.2?Expected return: With No Security Interests?Debtor borrows with r = 0.0778?
Success (50%? Failure?50%? Expected Return
C1   100   85.56    92.78
C2   215.56  184.44 200
Debtor     4.44    0     2.22
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Figure 1: Illustration of Borrowing and Investment
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